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Abstract
Financial Decision Making Under Stress
By Narek Vartan Bejanyan
Claremont Graduate University: 2021
The aim of this paper is to examine the link between individual’s financial decisions and
stress. In a laboratory experiment, Holt and Laury lottery was used to elicit participants risk
preferences. The Cold Pressor Test was used to induce a safe level of stress. In the treatment
group, 62% of participants are risk averse; versus 76% in the control group. Additionally,
inconsistent financial decision making was observed in both groups: 55% of participants in the
treatment group versus 30% in the control.
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Chapter 1
Financial Decision Making Under Stress
Introduction
Decision making under stress has been a determining factor for individuals in society that
dictates whether they have a successful decision making outcome or not. From an evolutionary
perspective, an individual’s decision making abilities under stress, for example when a lion attacks
a person’s camp, determines their chances of survival. Society has evolved to the point where we
do not often face life threatening situations like a lion attack. However, there are still instances
where we commonly find ourselves under stress: taking exams, buying stocks, running in/out of a
burning building, and making financial decisions, to name a few.
Therefore, it is of great relevance to examine financial decision making under stress.
Financial decision making has been studied in many different contexts in attempt to understand
and increase individuals’ utility. This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment which
elicited participant’s risk preferences under stress. The experiment tested the hypothesis of
whether participants under stress exhibit risk averse, loving, or neutral behavior. The main
hypothesis was tested in a laboratory experiment using a Holt Laury’s lottery task to elicit
participants risk preferences. The Cold Pressor Test (CPT) was used to induce a safe level of
stress.
The main hypothesis is that participants under stress will exhibit risk aversion behavior
when making financial decisions. Participants are less likely to take a risk in the presence of stress.
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Literature Review
2.1 Holt and Laury
Holt and Laury (HL) in 2002 introduced a menu of choices tasks that can be used to
estimate the degree of risk aversion as well as specific functional form. Participants in an HL
designed experiment choose between two options ten times as the expected payoffs change (Holt
and Laury, 2002, p.1644). Depending on when participants switch options, their risk preference
is revealed (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1646).
For the current experiment, the payoffs for the less risky option is $4.00 or $3.50 (option
A), which is much less than the potential payoffs of $7.00 or $1.00 in the more risky option (option
B) (Table 1). The two options are randomly presented to participants ten times. Each time the
options are presented, the probability of earning a higher payoff increases and the probability of
earning a lower payoff decreases. For example, in the first choice, the probability of the high
payoff ($4.00 or $7.00) for each option is 1/10 versus for the lower payoff ($3.50 or $1.00) the
probability is 9/10; hence, only an extreme risk seeker would choose a more risky option (Option
B) (Table 1). On the other hand, even the most risk-averse person should switch over by decision
10 in the bottom row, since the more risky option (option B) yields a sure payoff of $7.00 (Table
1).
The switching point is determined where expected payoff differences changes from
positive to negative. Specifically, the expected payoff incentive to choose less risky Option A
ranges from $1.95 to -$3.00 (Table 1). The payoffs for the lottery choices in the experiment were
selected so that the switching point would provide an interval estimate of a participant’s coefficient
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of relative risk aversion (Table 2). Furthermore, the payoff numbers for the lotteries so that the
risk-neutral choice pattern of four safe choices followed by six risky choices was optimal for
constant relative risk aversion in the interval (-.24,.19) (Table 2).
In literature, constant relative risk aversion is generally assumed due to functional form
being logarithmic linear and computationally convenient (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1646).
Therefore, calculated risk aversion can be interpreted as: risk preference for r < 0, risk neutrality
for r = 0, and risk aversion for r > 0 (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1646). However, constant relative
risk aversion is not a necessary assumption for an HL designed experiment.
2.2 Cold Pressor Test
Hines and Brown (1936) originally developed the Cold Pressor Test (CPT) as a procedure
which is carried out by immersing an extremity in ice water (p.1). That is, one hand was immersed
above the wrist in ice water ranging from 4O to 5O C for about 20 to 30 secs (Hines & Brown, 1936,
p.2). In recent literature, experimentalists have used two components of electrodermal activity
(EDA) to record and analyze participants’ responses to the CPT: skin conductance level (SCL)
and non-specific skin conductance responses (NS.SCRs). For example, the CPT was used in an
experiment in which SCLs were utilized to develop a relative intra-individual comparison
(Horstick et al., 2018, p.2). Specifically, authors demonstrated that the SCL can be used as an
index of sympathetic activation as result of the effects of physical stress situations (Horstick et al.,
2018, p.8). Also, Posada-Quintero et al. (2016) use EDA differences between baseline conditions
and three treatments to elicit sympathetic activation: postural stimulation, CPT, and the Stroop test
(p.3125). The authors found significant differences in NS.SCRs and SCL when comparing
baseline to the CPT (Posada-Quintero et al., 2016, p.3125).
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2.3.1 Risk Aversion: Humans
Ruixun et al. (2014) specified several measures of risk aversion that have been developed
including curvature of utility functions, labor supply behavior, option prices, and others (p.17777).
Risk aversion as a basic insight into human behavior has been studied academically dating back to
the St. Petersburg Paradox (Ruixun et al., 2014, p17779). The paradox originated from Daniel
Bernoulli's presentation of the problem and solution published in 1738 (Ruixun et al., 2014,
p17779). Bernoulli’s pioneering work on gambling introduced a formal framework to investigate
risk aversion (Ruixun et al., 2014, p17779). That is, expected values are measured by multiplying
each possible gain by the number of ways in which it can occur and then dividing the sum of these
products by the total number of possible cases (Bernoulli, 1954, p. 24). There is no reason to
assume that any two individuals encounter identical risks; and neither should one expect to have
his desires more closely fulfilled (Bernoulli, 1954, p. 24). Similarly, not all characteristics of an
individual should to be considered, only ones that pertain to the terms of risk (Bernoulli, 1954, p.
24).
Centuries after Bernoulli, in 1944 Neumann V. J. and Oskar M. developed the theory of
expected utility—an individual may determine the maximum utility which can be obtained with
quantities of goods at his disposal (p.30). Furthermore, given that the assumptions above the
maximum is a well-defined quantity; the increase of any definite good is well-defined when added
to the stock of all goods in the possession of the individual (Neumann V. J. and Oskar M., 1944,
p.31).
These authors are describing the classical notion of the marginal utility of the commodity
in question, or more precisely, indirectly dependent expected utility (Neumann V. J. and Oskar
M., 1944, p.31). These quantities are clearly of decisive importance in the Robinson Crusoe
4

economy (Neumann V. J. and Oskar M., 1944, p.31). If an individual is behaving rationally, then
marginal utility corresponds to the maximum effort an individual is willing to exert to obtain one
more unit of that commodity (Neumann V. J. and Oskar M., 1944, p.31). However, it is not clear
what significance marginal utility has in determining the behavior of a participant in a social
exchange economy.
A few decades after Von Neumann and Morgenstern work in the 70’s, Kahneman and
Tversky’s groundbreaking prospect theory introduced behavioral decision making under
uncertainty. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent
with the basic tenets of utility theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.265). The certainty effect
describes individuals with the tendency to underweight outcomes that were merely probable in
comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.265).
The certainty effect contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and contributes to
risk seeking in choices involving sure losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.265).
Second, the isolation effect describes individuals with the tendency to discard components
that are shared by all prospects under consideration (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.271). The
isolation effect leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different
forms (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.271).
2.3.2 Risk Aversion: Animals
Stress has been studied using human subjects in various fields such as Economics,
Psychology, Sociology, and Zoology. Specifically, there have been studies using animals to
examine the effects of stress on decision making processes in field of Zoology. In animal literature,
the energy budget rule describes risk sensitivity as the response of organisms whose goal is the
maximization of Darwinian fitness in stochastic environments (Weber et al., 2004, p.430).
5

The energy budget rule explains animals' risk preferences like prospect theory does for
human beings (Weber et al., 2004, p.434). The energy budget rule predicts risk aversion when
animals are not in danger of starvation or domain of gains versus risk seeking when there is
danger of starvation or domain of losses (Weber et al., 2004, p.434). Specifically, ratio
comparisons are not restricted to just human comparisons of money savings (Weber et al., 2004,
p.434). For example, a large amount of evidence suggests that rats use comparisons of
numericities involving ratio operations (Gallistel and Gelman, 1992, p.44).
Risk aversion as a determining factor in financial decision making has been studied
vigorously within previous literature. Furthermore, both human and animal experiments have
studied the decision making process under optimal neural capacity. However, there is a gap in
literature that is prevalent when considering individuals financial decision making under stress.
This research is contributing to literature by filling in this gap with results from a laboratory
experiment where participants’ financial decisions were studied under stress.
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Methods
3.1 Sample
Potential participants were recruited utilizing an approved email distribution list from the
Center for Neuroeconomics Studies (CNS) website. In total, 68 individuals were recruited to
participate in the experiment titled Risk Experiment Under Stress. The laboratory experiment was
approved by the Institutional Review Board (#2914). Participants were notified before arriving
that the opportunity involved completing surveys, some of which would be done after immersing
their dominant hand in cold or warm water. They were also informed that immersing their hand
would increase their heart rate and cause them varying levels of pain.
3.2 Procedure
Participants were asked to arrive at the Center for Neuroeconomics Studies (CNS) lab
located in Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA. Upon arrival, participants were given
a consent form with a detailed explanation of the experiment. Within the consent form, a clear
description of the earning was disclosed: “You will earn a maximum of $7 on the lottery task that
you will complete after you immerse your hand in ice or warm water. You will earn $.50 for every
15 secs of you holding your hand under ice or warm water, maximum amount of time allowed is
2 minutes. Possible earnings total $11” ( Consent Form).
Once written consent was provided, participants received an identity masking code and
were randomly assigned to control or treatment groups.

Participants were informed their

participation would take approximately 25-30 min. Immediately, a lab administrator screened for
conflicts with increased heart rate due to the cold pressor test. Participants were excluded if they
had a history of cardiovascular disorder, fainting, seizures, Raynaud's phenomenon, frostbite, and
7

open cut/fracture on their dominant hand. Also, participants under the age of 18 were excluded.
Verbal instruction was given before beginning the experiment to assure participants
understood their earnings and the CPT procedure. Participants were informed that they may
remove their hand from the water when they wished. Furthermore, they should keep in mind the
longer they kept their hand in the water the higher their pay will be. Participants were informed
that a maximum of two minutes was allowed and the experimenter would stop the CPT only when
they have reached the maximum of two minutes. Participants were not informed of how long they
had their hand in water, only when they reached the maximum amount of time allowed.
The only difference between the control and treatment groups was the water temperature.
The temperature of the water was recorded a few minutes prior to participants scheduled time slot.
However, the temperature was not disclosed to the participants. Hence, participants had no prior
knowledge if they were in the control versus treatment groups before the beginning of the
experiment. Warm water temperature for the control group ranged between 20.3 O and 20.5O C;
which was approximately room temperature. Conversely, the cold water ranged between -2 O and
-.6O C.
Thereafter, the experimenter prepared and attached electrodermal activity (EDA) sensors
onto participants non-dominate hand. Once EDA sensors were placed, participants were asked to
sit and rest for three minutes while baseline levels were recorded. Participants were put through
the cold pressor test by immersing their dominant hand above the wrist in water.
Immediately after the CPT is administered, participants completed an HL designed lottery
task to measure their risk preferences. QualtricsXM online survey platform was used to design and
recorded the HL lottery task for all the participants.
8

3.3 Measures
Electrodermal activity (EDA) was recorded to measure participants physiological
responses that influenced their risk preferences in the presences of stress. According to Horstick
et al. (2018), EDA has become a psychophysiological standard method for the measuring
sympathetic activity (p.2). Sympathetic nervous system activates what is commonly known as
the fight or flight response. Additionally, EDA reflects external and internal factors that influence
psychophysical activations due to the integration of central nervous processes into the sweat gland
(Horstick et al., 2018, p.2).
EDA was extracted over two experimental episodes: baseline and treatment. The last two
minutes of the baseline were used to reduce the noise in the data being analyzed. The first
component of EDA recorded was skin conductivity levels (SCL), which are a tonic component of
skin conductivity referred to as the general arousal of a person. The second component was skin
conductance responses (SCRs), which are short phasic electrodermal responses that increase
within one second after a discrete stimulus. Specifically, non-specific skin conductance responses
(NS.SCRs) are used. This is the number of SCRs in a period and are considered a tonic measure
because they occur post-stimuli (Posada-Quintero et al., 2016, p.3125).
EDA data was recorded with Biopac MP 150. AcqKnowledge® software was used to
make corrections and measure EDA data components. First, EDA waveforms were transformed
using a low-pass filter of 10 Hz with a sampling rate of eight (Norris et al., 2007, p.824). Second,
a square root function was used to adjust for skew within the recorded sample (Dawson et al.,
2000, p.226). Third, to preprocess and delete artifacts in the data in order to identify NS.SCRs,
the sampling rate of the recorded waveforms were reduced to 31.25 Hz and smoothed by a median
filter (Horstick et al., 2018, p.4).
9

3.4 Psychological Measures
The main psychological measures being used for this experiment is positive affect and
negative affect schedule (PANAS).

Watson et al. (1988) designed the PANAS to assess

participants’ negative and positive affect. Item scores range from 1 “not at all” to 5 “extremely”
(p.1063). Positive affect (PA) and Negative affect (NA) subscales were computed by averaging
the ten items per subscale (Watson et al, 1988, p.1063). The PANAS was assessed before and
after the CPT.
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Results
All computations are carried out using the Stata® statistical package (Version 14). The
participants were randomly assigned to two groups, the control group and the treatment group. 30
participants were assigned to the control group, and 38 were assigned to the treatment group.
Those in the treatment group underwent physiological change due to stress. The dependent
variable for this experiment is Risk Aversion (RA) measured within the HL lottery task. SCL
and NS.SCRs are the two components of EDA data that are being considered as independent
variables.
4.1 Physiological Measures
4.1.1 Skin Conductance Level (SCL)
The change in SCL (SCL) is the difference between the mean SCL during the CPT and
the mean SCL during the baseline. For the baseline, the last two minutes are used to create the
independent variable to reduce participants basal variability. As a result of baseline adjustments
for the participant’s (n=27), SCL became negative. This is observed in both groups. A constant
k=1 was added to all participants SCL to resolve this issue which is a common practice in data
analysis (Dawson et al, 2000, p.226).
The SCL in the control group is normally distributed, however it is not normally
distributed in the treatment group (Table 3 & 4). Also, the SCL does not exhibit skewness and
kurtosis in the control group; but it does exhibit skewness and kurtosis in treatment group (Table
5 & 6).
The results of an independent t-test showed that participants in the treatment group do have
statistically different SCL versus participants in the control group (MC: 0.98 ± 0.15 μS; MT: 1.18
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± 0.24 μS; t (66) = -4.02, p = 0.0002) (Table 1). Using a 5% confidence level, we can reject the
null hypothesis that the difference in means is statistically different for both groups as well as the
null hypothesis that the difference in variances is statistically different for both groups (F(66) =
0.388, p = 0.0101) (Table 2). The SCL one-way ANOVA test showed that there is statistically
significant difference between the two groups (F(1,66) = 14.56, p = 0.0003) (Table 3).
4.1.2 Non-Specific Skin Conductivity Responses (NS.SCRs)
The change in non-specific skin conductivity responses (NS.SCRs) is the difference
between the number of SCRs per second during CPT and baseline. Specifically, NS.SCRs are the
number of SCRs in a period and are considered a tonic measure because they occur post-stimuli
(Posada-Quintero et al., 2016, p.3125). As a result of baseline adjustments, the NS.SCRs for 12
participants’ turned negative. Furthermore, 11 participants do not have any NS.SCRs given the
chosen thresholds. Hein et. al (2011) suggest that the NS.SCRs an amplitude threshold of 0.005
μS since the stimulus includes participants receiving pain (p.3). Trials with delay periods lower
than 5 seconds were excluded to avoid contamination from artefacts caused by the pain stimulators
(Hein et. al, 2011, p.3). Similar to SCL, a constant k = 1 was added to preserve the dataset
(Dawson et al, 2000, p.226).
The NS.SCRs is normally distributed in the control group but not in the treatment group
(Table 3 & 4). Also, the NS.SCRs does not exhibit skewness and kurtosis in the control group.
In the treatment group, however, skewness and kurtosis are present (Table 5 & 6).
The results of an independent t-test showed that participants in the treatment group do have
statistically different NS.SCRs versus participants in the control group (MC: 0.99 ± 0.04 μS; MT:
1.05 ± 0.07 μS; t (66) = -4.06, p = 0.0001) (Table 1). Using a 5% confidence level, we can reject
12

the null hypothesis that the difference in means is statistically different for both groups as well as
the null hypothesis that the difference in variances is statistically different for both groups (F(66)
= 0.3169, p = 0.0020) (Table 2). The NS.SCRs one-way ANOVA test showed a statistically
significant difference between the two groups (F(1,66) = 14.58, p = 0.0003) (Table 3).
4.2.1 PANAS—Positive Affect (PA)
The PA in the control group is not normally distributed and it exhibits skewness and
kurtosis (Table 3 & 5). In the treatment group, however, the PA is normally distributed and
exhibits skewness and kurtosis (Table 4 & 6). The results of an independent t-test showed that
the participants in the treatment group do not have statistically different PA versus participants
in the control group (MC: -0.8 ± .96 PA; MT: -0.13. ± 0.89 PA; t (66) = -0.5115, p = 0.6108).
Using a 5% confidence level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the difference in means is
statistically different for both groups as well as the null hypothesis that the difference in variances
is statistically different for both groups (F(66) = 0.9179, p = 0.8198). The PA one-way ANOVA
test showed that there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups (F(1,66) =
.89, p = 0.5770).
4.2.2 PANAS—Negative Affect (NA)
The NA in the control group is not normally distributed and exhibits skewness and
kurtosis (Table 3 & 5). For the treatment group however, the NA is normally distributed and
does not exhibit skewness and kurtosis (Table 4 & 6). The results of an independent t-test showed
that participants in the treatment group do not have statistically different NA versus participants
in the control group (MC:2.37 ± .63 NA; MT: 1.53 ± .67 NA; t (66) = 0.9083, p = 0.3670).
Using a 5% confidence level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the difference in means is

13

statistically different for both groups as well as the null hypothesis that the difference in variances
is statistically different for both groups (f (66) = .6962, p = 0.3173). The NA one-way ANOVA
test showed no statistically significant difference between groups with or without stress (F(1,66)
= .94, p = 0.5404).
Table 1: T-test comparing control and treatment groups.

RA
Control
Treatment
# Safe Choices
Control
Treatment
SCL
Control
Treatment
NS.SCRs
Control
Treatment
PA
Control
Treatment
NA
Control
Treatment

n

Mean

SD

t-cal

Satterthwaite’s df

p

Decision

30
38

.54
.56

.54
1.38

-.08

50

.938

Accept

30
38

5.2
4.92

1.27
2.07

.68

63

.497

Accept

30
38

.98
1.18

.16
.15

-4.02

63

.000

Reject

30
38

.99
1.05

.04
.07

-4.06

60

.000

Reject

30
38

-.8
-.13

5.25
5.48

-.51

64

.610

Accept

30
38

2.37
1.53

3.47
4.16

.909

66

.367

Accept
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Table 2: Variance Results Comparing Control and Treatment Groups.
n

F

df

p

Decision

RA
Control
Treatment
# Safe Choices

30
38

.156

29, 37

.000

Reject

Control

30

.376

29, 37

.008

Reject

Treatment
SCL
Control
Treatment
NS.SCRs
Control
Treatment
PA
Control
Treatment
NA
Control
Treatment

38
30
38

.388

29, 37

.010

Reject

30
38

.317

29, 37

.002

Reject

30
38

.917

29, 37

.819

Accept

30
38

.692

29, 37

.3173

Accept
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Table 3: One-way ANOVA: Total Risk Aversion

Risk Aversion
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
# Safe Choices
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
SCL
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
SCRs
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
PA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Risk Aversion
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
SCL
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
SCRs
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
PA
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

Decision

.006
78.8
78.8

1
66
67

.006
1.19
1.17

0

.944

Accept

1.63
206.1
207.7

1
66
67

1.63
3.12

.52

.471

Accept

.65
2.94
3.59

1
66
67

.643
.045
.054

14.56

.0003

Reject

.055
.249
.304

1
66
67

.055
.004
.006

14.58

.000

Reject

7.49
1909.14
1916.63
Sum of
Squares

1
66
67
Df

7.49
28.93
28.60
Mean
Square

.26

.613

Accept

F

Sig.

Decision

.006
78.8
78.8

1
66
67

.006
1.19
1.17

0

.944

Accept

.65
2.94
3.59

1
66
67

.643
.045
.054

14.56

.0003

Reject

.055
.249
.304

1
66
67

.055
.004
.006

14.58

.000

Reject

7.49
1909.14
1916.63

1
66
67

7.49
28.93
28.60

.26

.613

Accept
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4.3 Control Variables
Age, Sex, Education levels, and average Income levels are the four control variables being
considered. Participant’s ages ranged between 18–58, with an average (M) = 24.75 and standard
deviation (SD) = 9.87. In the control group, participant’s ages ranged between 18–48, M = 22.46
and SD = 6.84. In the treatment group, participant’s ages ranged between 18–58, M = 26.55, and
SD = 11.5 (Table 7). For the aggregated sample pool, 46% of participants were males and 54%
were females. In the control group, 30% of participants were males and 70% were females. In the
treatment group, 58% of participants were males and 42% were females (Table 7).
Participants were asked if they consider themselves below average income, average
income, and above average income for their age group.

56% of participants categorized

themselves as below average income, 40% identified themselves as average income, and 4%
identified themselves as above average income.

In the control group, 50% of participants

categorized themselves as below average income, 43% as average, and 7% as above average. In
the treatment group, 61% identified themselves as below average income, 37% as average, and
3% above average (Table 7).
Participants were also asked their highest level of education. For the aggregated sample
pool, 16% of participants’ received only a high school diploma, 50% of them had some college
but no degree, 15% had a bachelor’s degree, 13% had a master’s degree, and 6% had a doctoral
degree. In the control group, 30% of participants’ received only a high school diploma, 47% had
some college but no degree, 13% had a bachelor’s degree, and 10% had a master’s degree. In
the treatment group, 5% of participants’ received only a high school diploma, 53% had some
college but no degree, 16% had a bachelor’s degree, 16% had a master’s degree, and 11% had a
doctoral degree (Table 7).
17

4.4 Distribution Ladder
Tukey’s ladder of powers test was used to identify significant functional transformations
for the two physiological variables in the treatment group since they are not normally distributed.
The Tukey test searches a subset of the ladder of powers for a transformation that converts nonnormal variables into normally distributed ones (Tukey, 1949, p.99). Ladder transformation for
SCL shows that out of nine possible functional transformations, the inverse (1/SCL) and one
over square [1/(SCL)2] will normalize the data. The inverse of SCL will be used to further the
analysis since it has a clearer interpretation as a measure of physiological arousal. For NS.SCRs
there is no known function that will normalize the distribution of the variable; however, inverse
function will be used to be consistent within the data analysis.
4.5 Correlations Matrixes
Pearson’s correlation coefficient matrix was used after non-normally distributed variables
were normalized (Horstick et al., 2018, p.4). A correlation matrix is constructed between the
dependent variable RA and the independent variables 1/SCL, 1/SCRs, PA, and NA. A
second correlation coefficient matrix is between RA and four control variables was also
considered: Age, Sex, Education, and average Income levels. Additionally, CPT, a dummy
variable for the treatment effect, has been include in the matrix.
RA and Education are statistically significant and negatively correlated (0.26, p = 0.0354)
(Table 9). Furthermore, CPT has a statically significant negative correlations with 1/SCL (-0.48,
p = 0.0000) and a negative correlation with 1/NS.SCRs (-0.46, p = 0.0001) (Table 8). The two
physiological measures 1/SCL and 1/NS.SCRs have a strong positive correlation (0.65, p =
0.0038) (Table 8).
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There was no significant relationship between the dependent variable RA and the
independent variables 1/SCL, 1/SCRs, PA, and NA (Table 8). In addition, RA does not have
a significant relationship with the three control variables: Age, Sex, and average Income levels
(Table 9).
4.6 Financial Decisions—Risk Aversion (RA)
RA was calculated for each of the ten HL lottery choices using the utility function
U(x)=x^(1-r)/(1-r) for money x, x > 0. RA was calculated by solving for r then taking the average
of RA for lotteries before and after participants switch. For example, if the switching point was at
lottery 7, RA was calculated for lotteries 6 and 7, then the average of the two was used. RA for
both groups is normally distributed and does not exhibit skewness and kurtosis (Table 3, 4, 5 &
6).
The results of an independent t-test showed participants in the treatment group do not have
statistically different RA versus participants in the control group (MC: 0.54 ± 0.54 r; MT: 0.56 ±
1.37 r; t(66) = -0.077, p = 0.9389). Using a 5% confidence level, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the difference in means is statistically different for both groups. However, can
reject the null hypothesis that the difference in variances is statistically different for both groups
(F(66) = .1560, p = 0.0000). The RA one-way ANOVA test showed that there was no statistically
significant difference between the two groups (F(1,66) = 0, p = 0.944).
4.7 Number of Safe Choices
As a second dependent variable the number of safe choices was recorded in the HL. The
number of safe choices is referring to the number of times participants choosing a less risky option
(option A) versus a more risky option (option B). There are ten lottery choices in the HL, hence
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participants can make a maximum of ten safe choices. The number of safe choices was created as
a variable in order to check the robustness of findings using RA as the dependent variable. The
results of an independent t-test showed participants in the treatment group do not have statistically
different number of safe choices versus participants in the control group (MC: 5.2 ± 0.23 r; MT:
4.92 ± .33 r; t(66) = 0.68, p = 0.497). Using a 5% confidence level, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the difference in means is statistically different for both groups. However, can
reject the null hypothesis that the difference in variances is statistically different for both groups
(F(66) = .388, p = 0.010). The number of safe choices one-way ANOVA test showed that there
was no statistically significant difference between the two groups (F(1,66) = .52, p = 0.471).
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Conclusion and Discussion
This experiment is contributing to the gap in literature by adding the results of a laboratory
experiment on financial decision making under stress. Financial decision making has been studied
vigorously due to its relevance to consumer and producer utility. However, on an individual level,
there was a gap in the literature when considering financial decision making and stress. The results
of the current body of work within the field of Neuroeconomics provides a solution using
physiological measures: SCL and SCRs. In the treatment group, SCL and NS.SCRs are
different from the control group, indicating that stress is changing participants physiological state.
Comparing participants means for RA in HL lottery task it is evident there is no statistical
difference between both groups. Participants on average have the same risk aversion preferences
with or without the occurrences of stress. On average, participants are likely to make the same
financial decisions. However, the variances for the two groups are statistically different. More
participants in the treatment group are exhibiting risk aversion in sure gains and risk seeking in
sure losses than in the control group.
The difference in variances has a similar outcome as described by certainty effect and
energy budget rule. Stress is a similar stimulus when it comes to making financial decisions as is
certainty. For animals, a similar stimulus occurs when an animal is danger of starvation. A
participant’s financial decisions under stress are extreme. That is, under stress in HL, more
participants are choosing one, two, nine, or ten safe lotteries. Approximately 21% of participants
under stress choose the two tail ended lotteries versus around 6% of participants without stress
(Table 2).
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Participants behaving consistently in their lottery choices was a key assumption when
constructing the dependent variable.

Within the data, it was observed that participants

areswitching from a less risky to a more risky option more than once. As pointed out in the original
HL paper, even for those who switched back and forth, there is typically a clear division point
between clusters of less risky and more risky choices, with few errors on each side (p.1648). The
dependent variable was constructed using this clear division in participants lottery choices. The
isolation effect provides a possible explanation in which individuals tend to be inconsistent when
presented with same choice in different forms. Specifically, 55% of participants in the treatment
group are switching more than once from a less risky (Option A) to a more risky option (Option
B) versus only 30% in the control group. That is, a much higher percentage of participants in the
treatment group are exhibiting inconsistent financial decisions.
Finally, financial decision making and physiological change as a result of stress are critical
to understanding real world financial outcomes. This study illustrates the impact of stress has on
financial decision making and concludes that stress plays a vital role in changing participants’ risk
preferences.
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Appendix A
Table 1: This Holt Laury lottery task was presented to the participants. To aid in explaining the
lotteries, they have been rearranged with the highest expected payoff differences from choosing
the less risky option being on top.
Option A
1

10% chance of winning $4.00
and 90% chance of winning
$3.50
2 20% chance of winning $4.00
and 80% chance of winning
$3.50
3 30% chance of winning $4.00
and 70% chance of winning
$3.50
4 40% chance of winning $4.00
and 60% chance of winning
$3.50
5 50% chance of winning $4.00
and 50% chance of winning
$3.50
6 60% chance of winning $4.00
and 40% chance of winning
$3.50
7 70% chance of winning $4.00
and 30% chance of winning
$3.50
8 80% chance of winning $4.00
and 20% chance of winning
$3.50
9 90% chance of winning $4.00
and 10% chance of winning
$3.50
10 100% chance of winning $4.00
and 0% chance of winning
$3.50

Option B

Expected Payoff
Differences

10% chance of winning $7.00
and 90% chance of winning
$1.00
20% chance of winning $7.00
and 80% chance of winning
$1.00
30% chance of winning $7.00
and 70% chance of winning
$1.00
40% chance of winning $7.00
and 60% chance of winning
$1.00
50% chance of winning $7.00
and 50% chance of winning
$1.00
60% chance of winning $7.00
and 40% chance of winning
$1.00
70% chance of winning $7.00
and 30% chance of winning
$1.00
80% chance of winning $7.00
and 20% chance of winning
$1.00
90% chance of winning $7.00
and 10% chance of winning
$1.00
100% chance of winning $7.00
and 0% chance of winning $1.00

$1.95
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$1.40
$.85
$.30
-$.25
-$.80
-$1.35
-$1.90
-$2.45
-$3

Table 2: Calculated risk aversion within the HL designed lottery task.

Number of
Safe Choices

Range of
Relative Risk
Aversion
U(x)=x^(1-r)/(1r)

0-1

r < -1.37

Risk Preference
Classifications
Highly Risk
Loving

2

-1.37 < r < -.74

Very Risk Loving

0%

0%

3

-.74 < r < -.24

Risk Loving

11%

13%

4

-.24 < r < .19

16%

7%

Proportion of
Choices
for Treatment
Group

Proportion of
Choices
for Control
Group
3%

8%

5

.19 < r < .61

Risk Neutral
Slightly Risk
Averse

6

.61 < r < 1.04

Risk Averse

16%

43%

7

1.04 < r < 1.54

Very Risk Averse

9%

7%

8

1.54 < r < 2.26

Highly Risk Averse

5%

3%

9-10

2.26 < r

Stay in Bed

8%

0%

23%
24%

Table 3: Shapiro-Wilk test was used to determine if the variables are normally distributed for the
control group, n=30.
Risk Aversion
SCL
SCRs
PANAS pos
PANAS neg

W
.98034
.97372
.97334
.90097
.88130

V
.625
.835
.847
3.148
3.773

Z
-.972
-.372
-.342
2.371
2.746

Prob > z
.8344
.6449
.6339
.0088
.0030

Table 4: Shapiro-Wilk test was used to determine if the variables are normally distributed for the
treatment group, n=38.

Risk Aversion
SCL

W
.94628
.82620

V
2.041
6.718

Z
1.497
3.996

Prob > z
.0672
.0000

SCRs

.75093

9.463

4.715

.0000

PANAS pos

.94888

1.943

1.393

.0817

PANAS neg

.98621

.524

-1.355

.9123
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Table 5: Jarqu-Berra is a goodness of fit test was used to determine if variables are exhibiting
Skewness and Kurtosis for the control group, n =30.
Risk Aversion
SCL
SCRs
PANAS pos
PANAS neg

Pr (Skewness)
.7613
.1192
.6098
.0082
.0053

Pr (Kurtosis
.4345
.2900
.9545
.0022
.1636

Adj chi2
.74
3.83
.26
12.73
8.29

Prob > chi2
.6913
.1476
.8765
.0017
.0158

Table 6: Jarqu-Berra is a goodness of fit test was used to determine if variables are exhibiting
Skewness and Kurtosis for the treatment group, n =38.
Risk Aversion
SCL
SCRs
PANAS pos
PANAS neg

Pr (Skewness)
.8758
.0000
.0000
.0224
.5103

Pr (Kurtosis
.1319
.0007
.0001
.0172
.1840
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Adj chi2
2.46
20.66
27.14
9.16
2.36

Prob > chi2
.2922
.0000
.0000
.0103
.3079

Table 7: Participant demographics anomalously collected and stored.
Control (n=30)

Treatment (n=38)

Total (n=68)

Male

30%

58%

46%

Female

70%

42%

54%

Range Age

18-48

18-58

18-58

Average Age

22.46

22.46

24.75

Standard Deviation Age

6.84

11.5

9.87

Below Average Income

50%

61%

56%

Average Income

43%

37%

40%

Above Average Income

7%

3%

4%

High School Graduated

30%

5%

16%

Some College No Degree

47%

53%

50%

Bachelor’s Degree

13%

16%

15%

Master’s Degree

10%

16%

13%

Doctoral Degree

0%

11%

6%
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Table 8: Correlation matrix was constructed between the dependent variable and the independent
variables that include the two physiological measures SCL and SCRs; note the inverse
function was used to normalize the independent variables. Also, two psychological measures
PA and NA were used, and a dummy variable as a proxy for treatment effect called CPT.
There are 68 participants.
Risk
Aversion
Risk
Aversion

Inv(SCRs) Inv(SCL) PA

NA

CPT

1.0000

Inv(SCRs) -0.1026

1.0000

0.4050
Inv(SCL)

PA

NA

CPT

-0.1070

0.6483*

1.0000

0.3852

0.0000

-0.1165

-0.0715

-0.2042

0.3443

0.5621

0.0948

0.0134

0.0216

0.0331

-0.0700

0.9135

0.8614

0.1884

0.5703

0.0087

-0.4569*

-0.4765*

0.0625

-0.1088

0.9440

0.0001

0.0000

0.6125

0.3772
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1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

Table 9: Correlation matrix was constructed between the dependent variable and four control
variables: Age, Sex, Education levels, and average Income levels Also, a dummy variable as a
proxy for treatment effect called CPT was included. There are 68 participants.

Risk Aversion
Risk
Aversion

1.0000

Age

-0.1565

Age

Sex

Education

Income

CPT

1.0000

0.2024
Sex

Education

Income

CPT

0.1751

0.0050

1.0000

0.1532

0.6561

-0.2555*

0.5722*

0.0602

0.0354

0.0000

0.6257

0.0505

-0.1645

0.0022

-0.2340*

0.6824

0.1800

0.9855

0.0548

0.0087

0.2070

-0.2781*

0.3208*

-0.1244

0.9940

0.0903

0.0217

0.0077

0.3123

30

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

Chapter 2
Inconsistent Financial Decision Making Under Stress
Introduction
This research paper presents new evidence which proves that participants under stress
make inconsistent financial decisions. Participants made inconsistent financial decisions in a
laboratory experiment that included 30 participants in the control group, and 38 participants in the
treatment group. In the treatment group, participants’ financial decisions were inconsistent at a
much higher overall percentage, compared to the control group without stress.
The Holt Laury’s (HL) lottery task is used to assess participants’ risk aversion. The Cold
Pressor Test (CPT) is used to induce a safe level of stress in the treatment group. In the HL lottery
task, participants completed ten lottery choices between less and more risky options, allowing risk
aversion to be calculated. For participants’ risk aversion to be calculated, a participant who first
chooses the less risky option should switch only once from a less risky to a more risky option.
That is, once a participant chooses a more risky lottery, she is expected never to switch again to a
less risky option. Any participant that would depart from this behavioral pattern would be
exhibiting inconsistent financial decision making.
One possible solution when working with participants’ inconsistent data is to look at the
clear division in the data, as pointed out in the original HL paper. Specifically, for participants
who are inconsistent, there is typically a clear division point between clusters of less and more
risky options, with few errors on each side (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1648). However, in order to
gain further insight a dependent variable representing inconsistent financial behavior is created
and analyzed. Participants’ physiological and psychological measures are used in order to explain
their inconsistent financial decisions.
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Literature Review
2.1 Holt and Laury
Holt and Laury (HL) in 2002 introduced a menu of choices tasks that can be used to
estimate the degree of risk aversion as well as specific functional form. Participants in an HL
designed experiment choose between two options ten times as the expected payoffs change (Holt
and Laury, 2002, p.1644). Participants should switch options once the magnitude of expected
payoffs changes from positive to negative (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1645). Depending on when
participants switch options, their risk preference is revealed (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1646).
For the current experiment, the payoffs for the less risky option is $4.00 or $3.50 (option
A), which is much less than the potential payoffs of $7.00 or $1.00 in the more risky option (option
B) (Table 1). The two options are randomly presented to participants ten times. Each time the
options are presented, the probability of earning a higher payoff increases and the probability of
earning a lower payoff decreases. For example, in the first choice, the probability of the high
payoff ($4.00 or $7.00) for each option is 1/10 versus for the lower payoff ($3.50 or $1.00) the
probability is 9/10; hence, only an extreme risk seeker would choose a more risky option (Option
B) (Table 1). On the other hand, even the most risk-averse person should switch over by decision
10 in the bottom row, since the more risky option (option B) yields a sure payoff of $7.00 (Table
1).
The switching point is determined where expected payoff differences changes from
positive to negative. Specifically, the expected payoff incentive to choose less risky Option A
ranges from $1.95 to -$3.00 (Table 1). The payoffs for the lottery choices in the experiment were
selected so that the switching point would provide an interval estimate of a participant’s coefficient
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of relative risk aversion (Table 2). Furthermore, the payoff numbers for the lotteries so that the
risk-neutral choice pattern of four safe choices followed by six risky choices was optimal for
constant relative risk aversion in the interval (-.24,.19) (Table 2).
In literature, constant relative risk aversion is generally assumed due to functional form
being logarithmic linear and computationally convenient (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1646).
Therefore, calculated risk aversion can be interpreted as risk preference for r < 0, risk neutrality
for r = 0, and risk aversion for r > 0 (Holt and Laury, 2002, p.1646). However, constant relative
risk aversion is not a necessary assumption for HL designed experiments.
2.2 Cold Pressor Test
Hines and Brown (1936) originally developed the Cold Pressor Test (CPT) as a procedure
which is carried out by immersing an extremity in ice water (p.1). That is, one hand was immersed
above the wrist in ice water ranging from 4O to 5O C for about 20 to 30 seconds (Hines & Brown,
1936, p.2). In recent literature, experimentalists have used two components of electrodermal
activity (EDA) to record and analyze participants’ responses to the CPT: skin conductance level
(SCL) and non-specific skin conductance responses (NS.SCRs).
For example, the CPT was used in an experiment in which SCLs were utilized to develop
a relative intra-individual comparison (Horstick et al., 2018, p.2).

Specifically, authors

demonstrated that the SCL can be used as an index of sympathetic activation as result of the effects
of physical stress situations (Horstick et al., 2018, p.8). Also, Posada-Quintero et al. (2016) use
EDA differences between baseline conditions and three treatments to elicit sympathetic activation:
postural stimulation, CPT, and the Stroop test (p.3125). The authors found significant differences
in NS.SCRs and SCL when comparing baseline to CPT (Posada-Quintero et al., 2016, p.3125).
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2.3 Inconsistent Financial Decisions
Consistency is the fundamental axiom underlying rational behavior in the neoclassical
construct of utility maximization (Afriat, 1976, p.76). The study of consistency was formalized
with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), which is equivalent to Afriat’s
cyclical consistency condition (Varian, 1982, p.947). For GARP to be satisfied, it is a necessary
and sufficient condition for data to be consistent with utility maximization (Varian, 1982, p.948).
Regardless of the popoularity of GARP in Neoclassical Economics, numerous studies have
provided examples of it being violated. Within the field of Behavioral Psychology, evidence of
inconsistency was provided by how choices are framed (Kamen and Taversky, 1981, p.453).
Inconsistent responses to problems arise from the conjunction of a framing effect with
contradictory attitudes toward risks involving gains and losses (Kamen and Taversky, 1981,
p.453). Also, the isolation effect describes individuals with the tendency to discard components
that are shared by all prospects under consideration (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.271). The
isolation effect leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different
forms (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.271).
Recent laboratory experiments suggest that a degree of choice inconsistency might be
present in human decision making. Specifically, HL method allows participants to switch freely
between options, which may lead to participants making inconsistent choices by switching more
than once (Charness et al., 2013, p.47). For example, 25% of participants switched their lottery
choices more than once in a study that compares the HL’s risk attitude elicitation with a risk
attitude classification associated with insurance behavior (Corcos et al., 2018, p.13).
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Methods
3.1 Sample
Potential participants were recruited utilizing an approved email distribution list from the
Center for Neuroeconomics Studies (CNS) website. In total, 68 individuals were recruited to
participate in the experiment titled Risk Experiment Under Stress. The laboratory experiment was
approved by the Institutional Review Board (#2914). Participants were notified before arriving
that the opportunity involved completing surveys, some of which would be done after immersing
their dominant hand in cold or warm water. They were also informed that immersing their hand
would increase their heart rate and cause them varying levels of pain.
3.2 Procedure
Participants were asked to arrive at the Center for Neuroeconomics Studies (CNS) lab
located in Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA. Upon arrival, participants were given
a consent form with a detailed explanation of the experiment. Within the consent form, a clear
description of the earning was disclosed: “You will earn a maximum of $7 on the lottery task that
you will complete after you immerse your hand in ice or warm water. You will earn $.50 for every
15 secs of you holding your hand under ice or warm water, maximum amount of time allowed is
2 minutes. Possible earnings total $11” ( Consent Form).
Once a written consent was provided, participants received an identity masking code and
were randomly assigned to control or treatment groups.

Participants were informed their

participation would take approximately 25-30 minutes. Immediately, a lab administrator screened
for conflicts with increased heart rate due to the cold pressor test. Participants were excluded if
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they had a history of cardiovascular disorder, fainting, seizures, Reynald’s phenomenon, frostbite,
or an open cut/fracture on their dominant hand. Also, participants under the age of 18 were
excluded.
Once written consent was provided, participants received an identity masking code and
were randomly assigned to control or treatment groups.

Participants were informed their

participation would take approximately 25-30 min. Immediately, a lab administrator screened for
conflicts with increased heart rate due to the cold pressor test. Participants were excluded if they
had a history of cardiovascular disorder, fainting, seizures, Raynaud's phenomenon, frostbite, and
open cut/fracture on their dominant hand. Also, participants under the age of 18 were excluded.
Verbal instruction was given before beginning the experiment to assure participants
understood their earnings and the CPT procedure. Participants were informed that they may
remove their hand from the water when they wished. Furthermore, they should keep in mind the
longer they kept their hand in the water the higher their pay will be. Participants were informed
that a maximum of two minutes was allowed and the experimenter would stop the CPT only when
they have reached the maximum of two minutes. Participants were not informed of how long they
had their hand in water, only when they reached the maximum amount of time allowed.
The only difference between the control and treatment groups was the water temperature.
The temperature of the water was recorded a few minutes prior to participants scheduled time slot.
However, the temperature was not disclosed to the participants. Hence, participants had no prior
knowledge if they were in the control versus treatment groups before the beginning of the
experiment. Warm water temperature for the control group ranged between 20.3 O and 20.5O C;
which was approximately room temperature. The cold water ranged between -2 O and -.6O C.
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Thereafter, the experimenter prepared and attached electrodermal activity (EDA) sensors
onto participants non-dominate hand. Once EDA sensors were placed, participants were asked to
sit and rest for three minutes while baseline levels were recorded. Participants were put through
the cold pressor test by immersing their dominant hand above the wrist in water.
Immediately after the CPT is administered, participants completed an HL designed lottery
task to measure their risk preferences. QualtricsXM online survey platform was used to design and
recorded the HL lottery task for all the participants.
3.3 Measures
Electrodermal activity (EDA) was recorded to measure participants’ physiological
responses influenced their risk preferences in the presences of stress. According to Horstick et al.
(2018), EDA has become a psychophysiological standard method for measuring sympathetic
activity (p.2). The sympathetic nervous system activates what is commonly known as the fight or
flight response.

Additionally, EDA reflects external and internal factors that influence

psychophysical activations due to the integration of central nervous processes into the vegetative
sweat gland (Horstick et al., 2018, p.2).
EDA was extracted over two experimental episodes: baseline and treatment. The last two
minutes of the baseline were used to reduce the noise in the data being analyzed. The first
component of EDA recorded was skin conductivity levels (SCL), which are a tonic component of
skin conductivity referred to as the general arousal of a person. The second component was skin
conductance responses (SCRs), which are short phasic electrodermal responses that increase
within one second after a discrete stimulus. Specifically, non-specific skin conductance responses
(NS.SCRs) are used. This is the number of SCRs in a period and are considered a tonic measure
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because they occur post-stimuli (Posada-Quintero et al., 2016, p.3125).
EDA data was recorded with Biopac MP 150. AcqKnowledge® software was used to
make corrections and measure EDA data components. First, EDA waveforms were transformed
using a low-pass filter of 10 Hz with a sampling rate of eight (Norris et al., 2007, p.824). Second,
a square root function was used to adjust for skew within the recorded sample (Dawson et al.,
2000, p.226). Third, to preprocess and delete artifacts in the data in order to identify NS.SCRs,
the sampling rate of the recorded waveforms were reduced to 31.25 Hz and smoothed by a median
filter (Horstick et al., 2018, p.4).
3.4 Variables
The dependent variable is the number of switches from a less risky to a more risky option
in the HL lottery task. To gain insight into inconsistent financial behavior, the dependent variable
Inconsistent was created. Inconsistent is an ordinal dependent variable that represents whether
participants are switching once, twice, or three times in the HL. The two main independent
variables being considered are the change in SCL (SCL) and the change in NS.SCRs
(NS.SCRs). Specifically, the results of a laboratory experiment showed participants do have
statistically different SCL and NS.SCRs as result of stress (Bejanyan, 2020, p.11).
The hypothesis for this study is that as result of stress being prevalent in the treatment
group, a larger percentage of participants will make inconsistent financial decisions. To establish
causation, the treatment was designed to increase participants’ level of stress during financial
decision making. Outcomes are compared between the treatment and control groups to accumulate
an understanding of why participants are switching more than once from a less risky to a more
risky option in the HL.
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Results
All computations are carried out using the Stata® statistical package (Version 14).
Participants without stress were randomly assigned to the control group, n=30. Participants with
stress were randomly assigned to the treatment group, n=38. The data for both groups has been
combined into one utilizing a dummy variable called CPT which is an indicator for the treatment
condition.
The dependent variable Inconsistent is the number of switches from a less risky to a more
risky option in the HL lottery task. In the HL, participants are expected to behave rational in their
risk preferences. That is, when participants are choosing between two options ten times, they are
considered behaving rational if they only switch once from a less risky and a more risky options.
Figure 1 shows 55% of participants in the treatment group are switching more than once from a
less to a more risky options versus only 30% in the control group. A one-sample t-test was run to
determine whether Inconsistent for 68 participants was different than normal, defined as an
Inconsistent of one (1.57 ± 0.08, 95% CI, 1.39 to 1.74; t(67) = 6.578, p = 0.000).
Two components of EDA data that are being considered as independent variables are SCL
and

NS.SCRs

(defined above).

Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) two

psychological measure that comprise PANAS are being explored. Also, four control variables are
being utilized: Age, Sex, Education levels, and Income.
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Figure 1: represents the percentage of participants switching more than once from a less risky to a
more risky option in the HL lottery task.

HL Lottery Task Under Stress
120%
100%
80%

30%
55%

60%
40%

70%
45%

20%
0%
Control (n=30)

Treatment (n=38)
Consistent

Inconsistent

4.1 Physiological Measures
4.1.1 Skin Conductance Level (SCL)
The change in SCL (SCL) is the difference between the mean SCL during the CPT and
the mean SCL during the baseline. For the baseline, the last two minutes are used to create the
independent variable to reduce participants basal variability. As a result of baseline adjustments
for the participant’s (n=27), SCL became negative. This is observed in both groups. A constant
k=1 was added to all participants SCL to resolve this issue which is a common practice in data
analysis (Dawson et al, 2000, p.226).
A one-sample t-test was run to determine whether the SCL for 68 participants was
different than normal, defined as a SCL of zero (1.10 ± 0.23 μS, 95% CI, 1.04 to 1.15 μS; t(67)
= 39.034, p = 0.000). The Shapiro-Wilk test determined that SCL is not normally distributed,
and it exhibits skewness and kurtosis.
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Tukey’s ladder of powers test was used to identify significant functional transformations
the physiological variable since it is not normally distributed. The Tukey test searches a subset
of the ladder of powers for a transformation that converts non-normal variables into normally
distributed ones (Tukey, 1949, p.99). Ladder transformation for SCL shows that out of nine
possible functional transformations, the inverse (1/SCL) and one over square [1/(SCL)2] will
normalize the data. The inverse of SCL will be used to further the analysis since it has a clearer
interpretation as a measure of physiological arousal.
4.1.2 Non-Specific Skin Conductivity Responses (NS.SCRs)
The change in non-specific skin conductivity responses (NS.SCRs) is the difference
between the number of SCRs per second during CPT and baseline. Specifically, NS.SCRs are the
number of SCRs in a period and are considered a tonic measure because they occur post-stimuli
(Posada-Quintero et al., 2016, p.3125). As a result of baseline adjustments, the NS.SCRs for 12
participants’ turned negative. Furthermore, 11 participants do not have any NS.SCRs given the
chosen thresholds. Hein et. al (2011) suggest that the NS.SCRs an amplitude threshold of .005
μS since the stimulus includes participants receiving pain (p.3). Trials with delay periods lower
than 5 seconds were excluded to avoid contamination from artefacts caused by the pain stimulators
(Hein et. al, 2011, p.3). Similar to SCL, a constant k=1 was added to preserve the dataset
(Dawson et al, 2000, p.226).
A one-sample t-test was run to determine whether the NS.SCRs for 68 participants were
different than normal, defined as a NS.SCRs of zero (1.03 ± 0.01 μS, 95% CI, 1.01 to 1.05 μS;
t(67)=125.96, p=.000). The Shapiro-Wilk test shows NS.SCRs does not normally distributed,
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and it exhibits skewness or kurtosis. A ladder transformation for NS.SCRs shows that out of
nine possible functional transformations, none will normalize the data. For NS.SCRs there is
no known function that will normalize the distribution of the variable; however, an inverse function
will be used to be consistent within the data analysis.
4.2 Psychological Measures
The main psychological measures being used for this experiment is positive affect and
negative affect schedule (PANAS).

Watson et al. (1988) designed the PANAS to assess

participants’ negative and positive affect. Item scores range from 1 “not at all” to 5 “extremely”
(p.1063). Positive affect (PA) and Negative affect (NA) subscales were computed by averaging
the ten items per subscale (Watson et al, 1988, p.1063). The PANAS was assessed before and
after the CPT. Both PA and NA were baselines adjusted for all participants. The PA for 68
participants has a mean of .43, range ± .65, with 95% CI, -.87 to 1.72. The NA for 68 participants
has a mean of 1.90, range ± .47, with 95% CI, .96 to 2.83.
4.3 Control Variables
Age, Sex, Education levels, and average Income levels are the four control variables being
analyzed. For the aggregated sample pool, 46% of participants were males and 54% were females
(Table 3). Participants’ ages ranged between 18–58, with an average (M) = 24.75 and standard
deviation (SD) = 9.87(Table 3).
Participants were asked if they consider themselves below average income, average
income, and above average income for their age group.

56% of participants categorized

themselves as below average income, 40% identified themselves as average income, and 4%
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identified themselves as above average income (Table 3). Participants were also asked their
highest level of education. 16% of participants’ received only a high school diploma, 50% of
them had some college but no degree, 15% had a bachelor’s degree, 13% had a master’s degree,
and 6% had a doctoral degree (Table 3).
4.4.3 Correlations Matrixes
Pearson’s correlation coefficient matrix was used after non-normally distributed variables
were normalized (Horstick et al., 2018, p.4). A correlation matrix is constructed between the
dependent variable RA and the independent variables 1/SCL, 1/SCRs, PA, and NA. A
second correlation coefficient matrix is between RA and four control variables was also
considered: Age, Sex, Education, and average Income levels. Additionally, CPT, a dummy
variable for the treatment effect, has been include in the matrix.
Inconsistent and CPT are statistically significantly and positively correlated (r = .2991, p
= 0.0132) (Table 4). Furthermore, CPT has statically significant negative correlations with
1/SCL (r = -.4765 p = 0.0000), and negative correlation1/NS.SCRs (r = -.4569, p = 0.0001)
(Table 4). The two physiological measures 1/SCL and 1/NS.SCRs have a strong positive
correlation (r = .6483, p = 0.0038) (Table 4).
There was no significant correlation between the dependent variable Inconsistent: 1/SCL
(r = .15, p = 0.233); or 1/NS.SCRs (r = .16, p = 0.199); or PA (r = -.05, p = 0.698); or NA (r
= -0.18, p = 0.136) (Table 4). In addition, Inconsistent does not have a significant correlation with
the four control variables: age (r = .05, p = 0.661); or sex (r = -.17, p = 0.154); or education (r =
.22, p = 0.078); or income (r = .07, p = 0.551) (Table 5).
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4.4 Ordered Logistic Regressions
Ordered logistic regressions are estimated to examine the effect stress has on inconsistent
financial decision making in the HL. First, a logit model represents Inconsistent as the dependent
variable and the independent variables as the Inv(SCL), Inv(NS.SCRs), and CPT. Note that
only Inv(SCL) was used in the first logit model, not Inv(NS.SCRs), since these two
physiological measures are highly positively correlated with each other (r = .65, p = 0.0038) (Table
4). The use of both independent variables would result in multicollinearity being prevalent within
the logit model, violating one of model’s critical assumptions. The results from the logit model
show Inconsistent is statistically significantly predicted by Inv(SCL) (p = .007) and CPT (p =
.001) (Table 6).
The second logit model represents Inconsistent as the dependent variable and the
independent variables as the Inv(SCL), CPT, PA, and NA. The results from the logit model
show Inconsistent financial behavior is statistically significantly predicted by Inv(SCL) (p =
.009) and CPT (p = .001) (Table 6). However, the results from the logit model show Inconsistent
is not statistically significantly predicted by PA (p = 0.646) and NA (p = .098) (Table 6).
The third logit model represents Inconsistent as the dependent variable and the independent
variables are Inv(SCL), CPT, PA, NA, Age, and Sex. Note that participants’ income and
education are negatively correlated (r = -.23, p = 0.055) (Table 5). Also, participants’ age and
education are highly positively correlated (r = .57, p = 0.000) (Table 6), hence only age will be
used in the third equation. The results from the logit model show Inconsistent is statistically
significantly predicted by Inv(SCL) (p = 0.008) and CPT (p = .002) (Table 6). However, the
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results from the logit model show Inconsistent is not statistically significantly predicted by PA
(p =.685), NA (p =.192), Age (p = .665), and Sex (p =. 529) (Table 6). Additionally, average
marginal effects after estimation of ordered logit models were utilized to gain a richer
interpretation of the coefficients (Table 7).
Ordered logistic regressions are estimated to examine the effect stress has on inconsistent
financial decision making in the HL for the second time using Inv(NS.SCRs). The same three
models are analyzed as before however Inv(NS.SCRs) are used only since there is a strong
correlation between the two physiological measures (Table 6). The results from the three logit
models show Inconsistent financial behavior is statistically significantly predicted by
Inv(NS.SCRs) (p = .007) and CPT (p = .001) (Table 8). However, the results from the logit
model show Inconsistent is not statistically significantly predicted by PA (p =.406), NA (p
=.178), Age (p = .844), and Sex (p =.669) (Table 8). Additionally, average marginal effects after
estimation of ordered logit models were utilized to gain a richer interpretation of the coefficients
(Table 9).
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Conclusion and Discussion
The processes of making financial decisions innately includes individuals making
inconsistent decisions. The results from this experiment show in the control group, 30% of
participants switched more than once from a less risky to a more risky option in the HL. The
inconsistent behavior recorded in the control group is consistent with previous literature (Corcos
et al., 2018, p.13).
More importantly, as a result of increasing participants’ stress levels, a much higher
percentage of participants switched more than once from a less to a more risky option in the
treatment group. Specifically, the results show 55% of participants under stress switched more
than once. Due to the increased stress the inconsistent behavior normally observed in the HL
lottery task has been drastically amplified.
Physiological and psychological data was recorded to substantiate the impact stress has on
participants’ financial decisions. In particular, the result from the ordered logistic models shows
that the number of switches from a less risky to a more risky option is significantly predicted by
the Inv(SCL) and CPT. The findings are supported by the work of Posada-Quintero et al., where
significant differences in SCL where found when comparing CPT to baseline (Posada-Quintero et
al., 2016, p.3125). However, the mediating and control variables do not significantly predicting
inconsistent financial behavior: PA, NA, Age, and Sex.
One possibility for solving the issues with participants’ inconsistent financial behavior in
the HL is to present all ten lottery options at once. In doing so, participants would be forced to be
consistent in their choices. The obvious problem with this method is that participants’ decisions
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will not reflect their true preferences. A second solution is provided by Holt and Laury, who
recommend looking at the clear division in choices when there are a few errors on each side of the
switching point. When considering both possible solutions a key assumption is that participants
are making consistent financial decisions, which is a contradicting assumption given the evidence
from this experiment.
Finally, this paper adds to the understanding of this obvious disparity in the literature by
presenting outcomes from a stress induced experiment. It highlights the need to not ignore
inconsistent financial decisions, and in doing so, to not assume individuals are merely behaving
irrationally. Specifically, with the use of physiological measures, this paper provides evidence
that participants switch more than once in the HL lottery task because of stress.
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Appendix B
Table 1: The Holt Laury’s lottery task presented to the participants. To aid in explaining the
lotteries, they have been rearranged with the highest expected payoff differences from choosing
the less risky option being on top.
Option A
1

10% chance of winning $4.00
and 90% chance of winning
$3.50
2 20% chance of winning $4.00
and 80% chance of winning
$3.50
3 30% chance of winning $4.00
and 70% chance of winning
$3.50
4 40% chance of winning $4.00
and 60% chance of winning
$3.50
5 50% chance of winning $4.00
and 50% chance of winning
$3.50
6 60% chance of winning $4.00
and 40% chance of winning
$3.50
7 70% chance of winning $4.00
and 30% chance of winning
$3.50
8 80% chance of winning $4.00
and 20% chance of winning
$3.50
9 90% chance of winning $4.00
and 10% chance of winning
$3.50
10 100% chance of winning $4.00
and 0% chance of winning
$3.50

Option B

Expected Payoff
Differences

10% chance of winning $7.00
and 90% chance of winning
$1.00
20% chance of winning $7.00
and 80% chance of winning
$1.00
30% chance of winning $7.00
and 70% chance of winning
$1.00
40% chance of winning $7.00
and 60% chance of winning
$1.00
50% chance of winning $7.00
and 50% chance of winning
$1.00
60% chance of winning $7.00
and 40% chance of winning
$1.00
70% chance of winning $7.00
and 30% chance of winning
$1.00
80% chance of winning $7.00
and 20% chance of winning
$1.00
90% chance of winning $7.00
and 10% chance of winning
$1.00
100% chance of winning $7.00
and 0% chance of winning $1.00

$1.95
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$1.40
$.85
$.30
-$.25
-$.80
-$1.35
-$1.90
-$2.45
-$3

Table 2: Calculated risk aversion within the HL lottery task.
Range
Relative
Aversion
Number of

of
Risk

Proportion
Choices
Risk Preference

Proportion of
of Choices

for
Control
for
Treatment Group
Group

Safe Choices

U(x)=x^(1-r)/(1r)

0-1

r < -1.37

Highly Risk Loving 8%

3%

2

-1.37 < r < -.74

Very Risk Loving

0%

0%

3

-.74 < r < -.24

Risk Loving

11%

13%

4

-.24 < r < .19

Risk Neutral

16%

7%

5

.19 < r < .61

Slightly Risk
Averse

24%

6

.61 < r < 1.04

Risk Averse

16%

43%

7

1.04 < r < 1.54

Very Risk Averse

9%

7%

8

1.54 < r < 2.26

Highly Risk Averse 5%

3%

9-10

2.26 < r

Stay in Bed

0%

Classifications
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23%

8%

Table 3: Participants’ demographics were anonymously collected and stored.
Total (n=68)
Male

46%

Female

54%

Range Age

18-58

Average Age

24.75

Standard Deviation Age

9.87

Below Average Income

56%

Average Income

40%

Above Average Income

4%

High School Graduated

16%

Some College No Degree

50%

Bachelor’s Degree

15%

Master’s Degree

13%

Doctoral Degree

6%

52

Table 4: Correlation Matrix between the dependent variable and the independent variables,
including a dummy variable for the treatment effect (n=68).
Inconsistent Inv(SCL) Inv(NS.SCRs) PA
Inconsistent

1.0000

Inv(SCL)

0.1466

NA

CPT

1.0000

0.2328
Inv(NS.SCRs
)

0.1577

0.6483*

0.1990

0.0000

PA

-0.0480

-0.2042

-0.0715

0.6975

0.0948

0.5621

-0.1826

0.0216

0.0331

0.1361

0.8614

0.1884

NA

1.0000

1.0000

0.0700

1.0000

0.5703
CPT

0.2991*

-0.4765*

-0.4569*

0.0625 -.1088

0.0132

0.0000

0.0001

0.6125

53

.3772

1.0000

Table 5: Correlation Matrix between the dependent variable and four control variables, including
a dummy variable for the treatment effect (n=68).
Inconsistent Age

Sex

Education Income

CPT

Inconsistent 1.0000

Age

0.0541

1.0000

0.6610
Sex

Education

Income

CPT

-0.1746

0.0050

1.0000

0.1544

0.6561

0.2151

0.5722*

0.0602

0.0781

0.0000

0.6257

0.0735

-0.1645

-0.2340*

0.5514

0.1800

0.0022
0.9855

0.2991*

0.2070

-0.2781*

0.3208*

-0.1244

0.0132

0.0903

0.0217

0.0077

0.3123

54

1.0000

1.0000

0.0548
1.0000

Table 6: Three ordered logit models were analyzed using the dependent variable inconsistent.
Standard errors are in the parentheses, **p < .01, *p < .05 two-tailed p-values test. Note,
Inv(SCL) was only used not Inv(NS.SCRs) since there is a high correlation between the two
independent variables.

Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

Inv(SCL)

4.73**

4.83**

5.19**

(.007)

(.009)

(.008)

2.14**

2.09**

2.13**

(.001)

(.001)

(.002)

.02

.02

(.646)

(.685)

-.12

-.09

(.098)

(.192)

CPT

PA

NA

Age

-.01
(.665)

Sex

-.35
(.529)

Observations

68

68

68

LR chi-squared

13.70

16.70

17.27

Prob > chi-squared

.001

.002

.008

Pseudo R-squared

.105

.129

.133

Mean VIF

1.29

1.18

1.25

55

Table 7. Average marginal effects after estimation of ordered logit models.
Equation (1)
Inv(SCL)
CPT
Equation (2)
Inv(SCL)
CPT
PANAS pos
PANAS neg
Equation (3)
Inv(SCL)
CPT
PANAS pos
PANAS neg
Age
Sex

# switches = 1

# switches = 2

# switches = 3

-.963**
(.001)
-.432**
(000)

.452**
(.007)
.222**
(.001)

.510**
(.017)
.210**
(.003)

-.941**
(.002)
-.411**
(000)
-.004
(.645)
.022
(.079)

.430**
(.008)
.208**
(.003)
.002
(.646)
-.010
(.104)

.510**
(.017)
.203**
(.003)
.002
(.647)
-.012
(.107)

-1**
(.001)
-.415**
(000)
-.003
(.684)
.018
(.177)
.002
(.663)
.068
(.533)

.456**
(.006)
.208**
(.003)
.002
(.686)
-.008
(.199)
0
(.663)
-.031
(.545)

.544**
(.015)
.206**
(.005)
.001
(.686)
-.010
(.199)
-.002
(.666)
-.036
(.531)

56

Table 8: Three ordered logit models were analyzed using the dependent variable inconsistent.
Standard errors are in the parentheses, **p < .01, *p < .05 two-tailed p-values test.
Variables
Inv(NS.SCRs)

CPT

(1)

(2)

(3)

17.63**

17.64**

17.78**

(.007)

(.009)

(.009)

2.17**

2.13**

2.12**

(.001)

(.001)

(.002)

.04

.04

(.406)

(.408)

-.11

-.103

(.107)

(.178)

PANAS pos

PANAS neg

Age

-.004
(.844)

Sex

-.238
(.669)

Observations

68

68

68

15.25

18.43

18.64

Prob > chi-squared

000

.001

.004

Pseudo R-squared

.117

.141

.143

Mean VIF

1.26

1.14

1.20

LR chi-squared

57

Table 9. Average marginal effects after estimation of ordered logit models.
Equation (1)
Inv(NS.SCRs)
CPT
Equation (2)
Inv(NS.SCRs)
CPT
PANAS pos
PANAS neg
Equation (3)
Inv(NS.SCRs)
CPT
PANAS pos
PANAS neg
Age
Sex

# switches = 1

# switches = 2

# switches = 3

-3.512**
(.001)
-.429**
(000)

1.637**
(.006)
.216**
(.001)

1.875**
(.017)
.212**
(.003)

-3.352**
(.002)
-.413**
(000)
-.007
(.4)
.022
(.087)

1.509**
(.008)
.206**
(.002)
.003
(.412)
-.009
(.113)

1.843**
(.019)
.206**
(.003)
.004
(.409)
-.012
(.117)

-3.364**
(.002)
-.410**
(000)
-.007
(.402)
.019
(.161)
0
(.884)
.045
(.667)

1.513**
(.008)
.206**
(.002)
.003
(.414)
-.008
(.183)
0
(.884)
-.020
(.669)

1.851**
(.018)
.204**
(.004)
.004
(.410)
-.010
(.187)
0
(.884)
-.024
(.669)
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Chapter 3
Trick for a Treat: The Effect of Costume, Identity, and Peers on Norm Violations
Introduction
Clothing serves the social function of communicating information about the wearer
to others. The economic importance of wearing the right clothes has led to memorable
proverbs such as “clothes make the man”, “dress for success”, and “dress for the job you
want and not the job you have”. While clothes clearly operate externally by communicating
information to others, clothes may also have an internal effect by influencing one’s own sense
of identity. Militaries dress their soldiers in uniforms as part of their socialization (Wakin,
2000; Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). Adam and Galinsky (2012) find that wearing a lab coat
increases performance on attention-related tasks and school uniforms have been found to
reduce disciplinary referrals (Sanchez et al., 2012). While the mechanisms for these effects
are not entirely clear, the results suggest that clothes can affect people’s behaviors, perhaps
through affecting one’s sense of identity.
We test this hypothesis by recruiting trick-or-treaters — children in costumed garb
— during the American holiday of Halloween. We consider this a boundary condition for the
effect of clothing on identity and behavior, as it is the day of the year in which participants
are dressed to the greatest extremes. Moreover, trick-or-treaters often use their costume to
take on the identity of specific characters from film or television, and these specific assumed
identities may have particularly salient effects on behavior. In addition, the function of
costumes for festivals and holidays, on its own, merits scientific study. Consumers spent $9
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billion in 2018 on Halloween products (National Retail Federation, 2018) and many cultures
around the world have developed traditions in which costume wear plays an important role.
Interestingly, costume-wear often develops alongside traditions of norm-violations.
Halloween evolved from the Celtic holiday of Samhain (Winkler and Winkler, 1970), in
which costumes were used, in part, to hide one’s identity during “tricks” or pranks (Miller et
al., 1991). In Venice, the tradition of wearing masks during Carnival developed alongside
activities that would otherwise be norm violations, such as mingling with other social classes,
gambling, having clandestine affairs, reveling, and illicit activity (Walker, 1999; Burke,
2005).
Thus, it is historically and culturally apropos to measure the effect of Halloween
costumes on ethical behavior. We use the lying game of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)
as our experimental paradigm. Trick-or-treaters privately roll a 6-sided die. If they report 1–
5, they receive one candy, and if they report a 6, they receive the one candy and an additional
bonus candy. If everyone tells the truth then the distribution of reported numbers would be
uniform. Sixes reported in excess within a sample of individuals can be interpreted as
evidence of lying for personal gain.
We manipulate three dimensions of the experimental conditions. First, we vary the
stakes to price lying behavior. In the high-stakes condition, a reported six earns two bonus
candies (three total) instead of the one bonus candy. Second, we vary the beneficiary of the
lie to test whether lying for others is normative. On the one hand, incurring a psychic cost of
lying to benefit someone else may be unappealing for some, but on the other hand, violating
a norm in order to benefit someone else may be itself perceived as normative as there is no

60

possible intimation of selfish behavior. In the baseline condition, the beneficiary is one’s self.
In the “other” condition, reporting a six earns someone in the next group of trick-or-treaters
an additional candy. In the “both” condition, the trick-or-treater rolls two dice, the first affects
one’s own payoff, and the second affects the payoff of a trick-or-treater in the next group.
The both condition allows us to measure whether behavior in the “self” (“other”) condition
spills over to behavior in the “other” (“self”) condition.
Third, we vary the degree of salience of one’s costume to observe how it affects the
trick-or-treater’s ethical behavior. The variation in Halloween costumes leads to a natural
separation in costumes between heroes and objects of admiration on the one hand, and
villains and creatures of a wicked nature on the other. For example, the most popular
costumes in our sample are (in order of popularity) a unicorn, Spiderman, Batman, Master
Chief of the video game Halo, evil clown, vampire, Jason from Friday the 13th. The first
four would be considered admirable by most people, while the latter three would be
considered wicked by most people. In the treatment condition, we ask the trick-or-treater who
they are dressed as, whether that character is a “good guy or bad guy”, and whether that
person does “good things or bad things”. This is intended to draw salience to the person’s
costume and the character’s ethical orientation. In the control condition, we ask the same
questions but after the participant has already reported their dice rolls.
Additionally, natural variation in participant age and arrival affords us the ability to
answer two other thematic questions. (1) Does age affect lying? This is an important question,
as a vast developmental psychology literature shows that children’s cognitive abilities and
behaviors mature at specific ages. (2) To what extent is lying in children influenced by peers?
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The experiment was run at a house on a street that hosts large crowds of trick-or-treaters.
Participants lined up and were allowed to advance to the porch in groups of 10, where upon
they were told the rules of the game. While participants advanced to the door of the house
one-by-one, participants behind them could likely hear their reports. Because we recorded
the order in which participants lined up, we can measure the effect of reporting a six on
subsequent participants’ reports. Specifically, we test the extent to which trick-or-treaters are
affected by same gender versus opposite gender peers. These two questions fall within the
paper’s broader theme of identity, in this case relating specifically to the trick-or-treater’s age
and gender identities.
We found frequent occurrence of six with 40% of participants reporting a six in the
baseline condition, which is approximately 23 percentage points more sixes than by chance
alone. Stakes had no effect on the number of reported sixes. The other-condition strongly
reduced the frequency of reporting a six. Many trick-or-treaters did not view the cost of lying
to be worth helping out an anonymous stranger. In the both-condition, the occurrence of
reporting a six to benefit one’s self decreased, while the occurrence of reporting a six to
benefit other’s did not change. The result suggests that participants’ honesty in reporting for
others spilled over to reporting for self but not vice versa.
Next, we test the effect of costume salience on participant’s behavior. Costume
choice is endogenous: the correlation between costume and lying would not necessarily
indicate a causal relationship. However, increasing the salience of a costume is random and
it is hypothesized to have different effects for those who are dressed as characters of
admiration (heroes or creatures of beauty), and those who are dressed as wicked characters.
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We hypothesized that drawing attention to the ethical orientation of one’s assumed identity
would lead to behavior consistent with that identity. That is “good guys” whose costumes are
rendered salient would lie less than “good guys” whose costumes are not made salient and
“bad guys” whose costumes are rendered salient would lie more than “bad guys” whose
costumes are not made salient. In fact, we found the opposite. The salience condition caused
good guys to lie more, by about 12 percentage points, than good guys in the control condition.
Bad guys with the salience of their costumes lied significantly less, by about 27
percentage points less, than bad guys in the control condition. We offer two possible
interpretations of these results. The results are consistent with a moral licensing effect for
good guys (Secilmis, 2018; Lasarov and Hoffmann, 2018). Making “good guy” salient may
have made individuals feel more justified in committing a norm violation, and the reverse
effect may have operated on “bad guys”. Alternatively, the effect may be driven by a feeling
of being monitored. The trick-or-treaters declared to an observing adult whether they were a
“good guy” or a “bad guy”. This may have changed the trick-or-treaters’ perceptions about
the extent to which they were being monitored. Perhaps self-declared “good guys” felt as
though they were putting themselves in our good graces, while self-declaring oneself as a
“bad guy” felt like it would warrant greater monitoring from us. We cannot test between
these two hypotheses but the physical structure of our experiment casts some doubt on the
plausibility of the latter hypothesis.
Finally, examining the natural variation of our sample, we find an inverted-U pattern
for the effect of age, with lying peaking at age 12. We find large and statistically significant
peer effects. One additional person reporting a six out of a group of five participants increases
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the probability of reporting a six by about 5 percentage points. Interestingly, as we
decompose this effect by gender, we find that most of the effect operates within gender. That
is girls follow girls and boys follow boys. It appears that gender identity prominently
moderates the peer effect.
We view our main contribution as showing that salience of one’s clothed identity
affects ethical behavior in the direction of a moral licensing/self-conscious effect.
Additionally, we find that gender identity influences behavior, with girls emulating girls, and
boys emulating boys in their reporting behavior. We also provide evidence on whether lying
for others is viewed as normative for children, and provide evidence for the existence of
within-person spillover effects and age effects.

64

Literature Review
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) developed an ingenious experimental paradigm
for the measurement of aggregate lying at the population level. In the original study
participants roll a die privately and obtain a reward based on the result they report to the
experimenter. They found that about 20% of participants lie to the fullest extent possible
while 39% of them are fully honest. The experiment has generated numerous variants (see
Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond, 2019, for a meta-analysis). Notably, Cadsby, Du and Song
(2016) run a variant in which they find that people lie to increase the payoff of an in-group
member even though such a lie does not affect their own monetary payoff.
A few recent economic papers have examined lying in children. Bucciol and Piovesan
(2011) conduct a similar experiment in a children’s summer camp with ages 5-15. They find
no association between lying and age, however they only report a linear specification and
their sample is small in their baseline condition (N=81). Glätzle-Rützler and Lergetporer
(2015) find that 10 and 11 year olds are more likely to lie than 15 and 16 year olds, consistent
with our age pattern. Maggian and Villeval (2016) run a somewhat different game in which
lying can yield higher payoffs, with 7–14 year olds. They find that 9-10 year olds lie more
than 7-8 year olds or 11-14 year olds. This is similar to our finding as we also have an
inverted-U as a function of age, though our peak age is 12. Brocas and Carrillo (2019) find
that middle-schoolers aged 11-14 lie significantly more than the other age groups (5-8 year
olds, 8-11 year olds, 14-17 year olds, and undergrads), which confirms our results. They
additionally provide evidence on lying as a function of age when the benefactor is another
child. They find that only middle-schoolers exhibit lying in the aggregate, and they lie to
reduce the other child’s payoff! In aggregate, we find that our subjects lie to benefit others;
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the difference between these results may be due to design differences and differences in
payoffs (for example, in their experiment, payment is strictly increasing in the die roll).
Finally, on the topic of stakes Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and Mazar, Amir and
Ariely (2008) do not find an effect of stakes on lying.
The research on peer-effects of norm-violations consistently finds that violations are
contagious. Gino, Ayal and Ariely (2009) conduct a cheating experiment in which a
confederate publicly announces that he has completed a task in an impossibly short amount
of time. If the confederate is an in-group member, cheating goes up relative to the baseline.
Interestingly, if the confederate is an out-group member (dressed in the clothes of a rival
school) cheating goes down relative to the baseline. Diekmann, Przepiorka and Rauhut
(2015) and Bicchieri, Dimant and Sonderegger (2020a) include conditions in lying
experiments in which subjects are informed about the lying behavior of others. They find
that information about the extent of lying in the population increases lying compared to the
control condition. In a charitable contribution game, Bicchieri et al. (2020b) find similarly
that learning about the empirical distribution of other’s contributions causes less compliance
with giving. Our results strengthen this literature, showing that direct observation of peers
reporting a six increases reporting a six. Our results extend this literature by showing that
contagion occurs within gender rather than across gender, in a sample of children. Consistent
with the findings of Gino, Ayal and Ariely (2009), we show that the identity of the observed
cheater moderates the contagion effect. They show it occurs via school affiliation, we show
that the results extend to gender identity.
Abeler, Nosenzo and Raymond (2019) summarize the theory literature on the that
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Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) paradigm. They categorize models into those that have
only, those that have lying costs with a preference for conformity, and those that have lying
costs and a preference for honest reputation. They conduct a Herculean meta-analysis of the
experimental literature as well as an additional large experiment of their own and they find
that only the last category of models, lying costs and a preference for an honest reputation,
explains the pattern of results. Our results are consistent with this finding in the sense that
(1) lying in our study is not maximal and this can be explained by lying costs. (2) Our salience
effect — salience causes good guys to lie more and bad guys to lie less — could be recast as
a preference for an honest reputation. The salience may make good guys feel like their exante reputational capital is higher, and the opposite may be true for bad guys. If there are
diminishing returns to reputation, then those who feel they have higher reputation are more
likely to spend it for a sweeter physical reward. This could generate our result. Of course, we
don’t observe or directly manipulate self-perceived reputation in our study, so this latter point
is speculative. We didn’t find economic models that relate to our other research questions.
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To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined the effect of the salience of
clothing on lying behavior. Research on the economics of clothing is limited but it has a long
history going at least as far back as Veblen (1899). Veblen observed that restrictive or delicate
clothing can be a costly signal indicating that the wearer is of the well-to-do “leisure class”,
since a laborer would be unable to function in such clothes. Clothing also communicates
people’s roles. For example, a concerned citizen can identify a police officer during an
emergency thanks to the officer’s uniform. Given that clothes communicate a person’s
identity to others, researchers have posited that clothes may also affect one’s self-identity.
Adam and Galinsky (2012) find that wearing a lab coat increases performance on attentionrelated tasks. School uniforms can reduce discipline referrals by 9.7% (Sanchez et al., 2012).
Civile and Obhi (2017) randomly assign participants to wear police-style uniforms
and then have them engage in an attention-related task. They find that uniforms cause
participants to attend more to images associated with lower socio-economic status. The
results establish that wearing clothes associated with particular roles in society, or identities,
can causally affect behavior.
Wearing costumes on Halloween that assume the identity of specific characters has
become a mainstream practice in American culture. A lab coat or a police officer’s uniform
have metonymic relationships with the institutions they represent. In contrast, many
Halloween costumes reflect specific characters (e.g. Batman or Moana) as opposed to broader
roles in society. Thus it is not clear whether the greater specificity common in Halloween
costumes can enable the kind of identification and change in behavior exhibited in the
aforementioned studies. However, casual observation suggests that at least some level
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that they like to act out in pretend play. Pretend play often accompanies the wearing of
costumes: Reys and Lukes swing their lightsabers against imaginary stormtroopers, Moanas
steer their imaginary ships to safety, and vampires suck the imaginary blood of their real
siblings (much to their parents’ dismay). Indeed, it seems that an important reason why
Halloween is so attractive to children is that it facilitates enjoyable roleplay.
Halloween evolved from the Celtic holiday of Samhain during which it was believed
that spirits and souls of the dead would return to earth (Sterba, 1948). The festivities involved
people going door-to-door in costume reciting verses in exchange for food (Linton and
Linton, 1950; Ward, 1981). Later in the 16th century Scotland, revelers would wear masks
or painted faces threatening to do mischief if they were not given food (Linton and Linton,
1950; Belk, 1990). Costume wearing and norm violations emerged contemporaneously in
this context, and the co-emergence of the two institutions have arisen in other cultures as
well. The wearing of costumes in Venice for Carnival originated alongside traditions of
mischief-making and intermingling of social classes that were otherwise discouraged from
mixing (Feil, 1998). We note several social functions that these costumes may have served.
First, disguising one’s outward identity while begging may have been a way for those
individuals to avoid harm to their reputation and the associated shame. Second, disguising
one’s outward identity while violating any rule, be it legal or an implicit cultural norm, has
the obvious benefit of avoiding punishment. Thus, disguises are complements with norm
violations, the presence of one in a tradition increases the marginal value of including the
other.
Masking one’s identity may make one more prone to norm violation. In addition,
research has shown that rendering specific aspects of one’s identity salient can change one’s
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propensity to violate norms. Recent studies find that bank employees become dishonest and
clergymen become more honest when their professional identity is rendered salient (Celse
and Chang, 2017). Cohn, Maréchal and Noll (2015) show that increasing the salience of
prisoner’s criminal identity increases dishonest behavior. In these studies, making an aspect
of the individual’s identity salient promotes ethical behavior congruent with that aspect.
However, a separate thread of research has established a potential countervailing force.
Moral licensing is the psychological phenomena in which boosts to self-image
increase engagement in unethical behavior (Nisan and Horenczyk, 1990). Sachdeva, Iliev
and Medin (2009) had participants write a short story about themselves or someone they
knew using morally positive trait words (e.g., fair, kind) or morally negative trait words (e.g.,
selfish, mean). Participants assigned to write about themselves using positive traits donated
the least out of the four conditions and those who wrote about themselves using negative
traits donated the most. Khan and Dhar (2006) obtained similar results, finding that
participants asked to imagine helping others donated less to charity than control subjects, and
Mazar and Zhong (2010) show that people act less altruistically and are more likely to cheat
and steal after purchasing green products than after purchasing conventional products.
Jordan, Mullen and Murnighan (2011) had participants recall one’s own moral or immoral
past actions or another’s moral or immoral past actions. They find that people who recalled
their own immoral behavior reported greater participation in moral activities, reported
stronger prosocial intentions, and showed less cheating than people who recalled their own
moral behavior. Similarly, Clot, Grolleau and Ibanez (2014) find that participants who
recalled their own moral actions subsequently cheated more to get a higher payoff than
participants who did not recall their moral actions. We extend the literature by measuring
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whether drawing salience to one’s costume affects the propensity to lie, differentially for
those dressed as “good guys” vs. “bad guys”.
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Methods
1.1

Sample and Setting
Our experiment was conducted on the dark and stormy night of Halloween, October

31st, 2018, at the house of one of the authors in a suburb of Los Angeles. The neighborhood
is a destination for trick-or-treating amongst nearby communities. A typical home in this
neighborhood is visited by about 1,000 trick-or-treaters. Trick-or-treaters who approached
the house between 6:00 and 9:30pm participated in the experiment. They were told that they
could play a game to win candies. In total, 544 trick-or-treaters participated. Other
participants of a spiritual and malevolent nature, may have participated, undimensioned and
unseen, without our knowledge.

1.2

Experimental Procedure

The experiment proceeded as follows. An experimenter advertised to passing trick-or-treaters
that they could play a game to win candies. Trick-or-treaters queued in front of the porch and
were randomly assigned to two lines. One line led to the no-salience condition and the other
line led to the costume salience condition. All subjects were given an ID card with a number
(1-10) and were instructed that they would need their ID card to exchange for candy. All
subjects were asked their age. A quietly observing experimenter recorded subjects’ answers
discretely along with other information such as gender, whether parents accompanied them
or not, time of the day, and the specific ID number. Those in the salience condition were
asked additional questions, “Who are you today?”, “Is (answer to the previous question) a
good guy or a bad guy?” and “Does (answer to the first question) do good things or evil
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things?” The subjects in the no-salience condition were asked the same questions but only at
the very end of the experiment. Subjects advanced approximately in the order they arrived.
We use the lying game introduced by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Ten subjects
were allowed to the porch at a time at which point we explained the rules of the game: they
would role a 6-sided die in a paper cup. If they rolled a 1-5, they would get one candy; if they
rolled a 6, they would win bonus candy. We also stated very clearly, “You don’t need to show
us the dice. Just tell us the number.” Experimenters at the end of the line asked for the number
and gave the promised number of candies.
1.3

Experimental Treatments

The experiment has 2×3×2 conditions: we varied the stakes (high vs. low), we varied who
the beneficiary of the bonus candy was (self vs. other vs. both), and we varied the salience of
subjects’ Halloween costumes (no-salience vs. salience). As mentioned above, the salience
condition was randomized at the individual level as trick-or-treaters approached the house.
The stakes and beneficiaries were randomized by group. We cycled through the six
conditions, alternating after every group of 10 subjects. We had a total of 55 groups.
We varied the stakes in order to price the effects of the other treatments. In both conditions,
subjects receive one candy for reporting any number. In the low-stakes condition, they earned
one bonus candy for reporting a six, and in the high stakes condition they earned two bonus
candies for reporting a six. Though the stakes are low, a pilot study conducted the year prior
suggested they would be adequate. In the pilot, the low-stakes condition paid 1 candy for a
reported one through four, 2 candies for a reported five, and 3 candies for a reported six. We
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found an excess of fives and an even greater excess of sixes. In the high-stakes condition the
rewards were 1 candy, 3 candies, and 5 candies. In that study we observed a significant effect
of high stakes. We expected that the 1 additional bonus candy in the high-stakes condition
would be sufficient.
In the “self” condition, the subject was the recipient of the bonus candy, and in the
“other” condition the recipient of the bonus candy was the subject in the next group with the
same ID number. In the “both” condition, subjects rolled one die for themselves and one die
for a subject in the next group. As mentioned above, subjects in the salience condition were
asked questions prior to the instructions, while subjects in no-salience condition were asked
the same questions after the number was reported.

1.4

Additional Covariates
In our regressions we include additional covariates. We wish to test whether there is

an age pattern in the propensity to lie. We censor ages from 4 to 19, to deal with outliers
(there are the rare 50 year-old trick or treaters). We estimate a quadratic specification for age,
allowing for curvature and a slope sign change.
Subjects were admitted to the porch in groups of 10 at which point they were handed
dice and explained the instructions. The children were in close proximity to each other as
they lined up to report their number. It would have been easy for children in line to overhear
the reports and earnings of children in front of them. This accidental feature of the design
allows us to identify peer effects. The exogenous arrival rate of trick-or-treaters creates
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variation in the composition of each group and our assignment of ID number creates variation
in the sequential order of the reporting. We estimate a coefficient for a “peer proportion”
variable defined as the proportion of previous participants in the group that reported a six. If
the person is first in their group we define peer proportion as zero. We decompose the peerproportion effect by gender. We define “female peer proportion” as the proportion of
previous female participants in the group that reported a six, and define the “male peer
proportion” variable in the analogous way for males. If there were no previous females in
the group then “female peer proportion” is defined as 0 and if there were no previous males
in the group then “male peer proportion” is defined as zero.
We include several covariates as controls to increase statistical power. In all statistical
models in which age is not the primary focus the quadratic age variables are not included; we
instead use a more flexible specification using 11 age categories. Ages 4 and less are the first
category, each age from 5 to 11 are their own categories, and ages 12-14, 15-18, and 19+ are
the last three categories. Some children are accompanied by their parents. Obviously, the
presence of one’s parents could have an effect on a child’s propensity to lie so we include a
parent indicator as a control. We also include a gender indicator as a control variable in all
models.

1.5

Multiple-Hypotesis Testing
A potential weakness of our research design is the large number of variables of interest.

Naïve multiple-hypothesis testing can inflate the chance of having statistically significant
results by chance, even under the null hypothesis. To control for false positives we include a
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false discovery rate (FDR) analysis. We use the method of Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli
(2006), which is the sharpened two-step FDR procedure. This procedure produces less false
negatives than the original FDR procedure. Any coefficient displayed in a table is included
in the set of hypothesis tests we use for our paper-wide FDR correction. The q-values are
equivalent to p-values that have been adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Results
1.6

Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our sample. Among a total of 544 subjects

who participated in our experiment, about 53% are female, and 41% are accompanied by
parents. The ages of our subjects range from 0 (baby) to 50 years old (as some parents also
joined the game) with an average age of 9.46 years old. The very young children were
accompanied by their parents. In the analysis, we bottom-code participants age at 4 years-old
and top-code participant age at 19 years-old due to the small samples outside of this range.
About 24% wore a self-reported bad-guy costume. The most popular costumes in order of
popularity were: unicorn, Spiderman, Batman, the Halo video game main character, clown,
vampire, and Jason from Nightmare on Elm Street.
The frequency of reporting a six within our sample is 41%, which is significantly
above the probability of rolling a six at 16.7%. This implies that a substantial number of our
subjects lied in the experiment. While traditional economic theory predicts that when there
is no cost to lying, people would always report a six, our results show that at least some
subjects are honest. The results are consistent with Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013),
with a substantial degree of lying.
Table 2 displays the raw totals and percentages of reporting a six by condition. The
high stakes and low stakes conditions both have approximately 40% reporting a six. The
differences between the beneficiary conditions is sizable. While 54% report a six in the self
condition, only 39% report a six in the other condition. Reporting a six further drops in the
both condition with 39% reporting a six for themselves and only 27% reporting a six for
others. Reporting a six is just as likely in the no-salience and salience conditions with only a
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Table 1: Summary Statistics

mean

sd

Six

0.41

0.49

0

1

Six_Self

0.47

0.50

0

1

Six_Others

0.33

0.47

0

1

Group

27.99 15.72

1

55

Age

9.46

5.38

0

50

Parents

0.41

0.49

0

1

Self Condition

4.61

1.66

1

6

Others Condition

4.28

1.66

1

6

Female

0.53

0.50

0

1

High Stakes

0.51

0.50

0

1

Salience

0.50

0.50

0

1

Bad Guy

0.24

0.43

0

1

Good and Bad

0.02

0.13

0

1

Age Category

9.33

4.11

4

19

Six within Group

2.24

2.25

0

12

Six within Group_Female

1.14

1.46

0

10

Six within Group_Male

1.10

1.34

0

8

Observations

544
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min max

1 percentage point separating the two. If there is a gender effect, it appears small, with boys
reporting a six only 2 percentage points more than girls. True to their names, there does
appear to be a difference between good guys and bad guys with six reports at 39% vs. 43%.
To better assess the effects of the treatments we turn to regression analysis.
Table 2: Raw Probabilities
Not Six

Stakes Low
stakes
High stakes
Total
Beneficiaries
Self

Outcome
Six

Total

No.

% No.

%

No.

202

60 137 40

339

211

60 142 40

353

413

60 279 40

692

84

46 100 54

184

Other

104

61

67 39

171

Both

225

67 112 33

337

103

61

66 39

169

122

73

46 27

168

Total

413

60 279 40

692

Salience No
Salience

203

59 140 41

343

Salience

210

60 139 40

349

Total

413

60 279 40

692

Gender
Male

191

59 133 41

324

220

61 141 39

361

Total

411

60 274 40

685

Costume
Good Guy

279

61 181 39

460

Bad Guy

83

57

62 43

145

60 243 40

605

Both - Self
Both - Other

Female

Total

362
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1.7

Main Results
We display the analysis of our treatments in Table 3. All columns report average

marginal effects of a logistic regression. Each cell of the table contains four statistics. The
number in the upper-left corner is the average marginal effect of the variable, the number in
the lower-left corner in parentheses is the standard error. The number in the upper-right
corner in italics is the naïve p-value of the average marginal effect and the number in the
lower-right corner is the sharpened FDR q-value in square brackets. The q-value can be
interpreted as a p-value that corrects for multiple hypotheses. Each cell of a table is
considered a hypothesis test for the purposes of the paper-wide FDR corrected q-values.
Column (1) regresses an indicator for reporting a six as the outcome on the stakes
condition, beneficiary conditions, gender, and the presence of parents. Additional unreported
controls include age categories. The effect of the high-stakes condition is not significant. The
“other” condition significantly reduces the frequency of reporting a six relative to the baseline
“self” condition. Subjects are less willing to lie to benefit an anonymous stranger than they
are if the benefit accrues to themselves. The negative coefficient in the “both” condition
indicates that having two die rolls reduced the occurrence of reporting a six to benefit one’s
self. The results show no effect of gender. In Column (2), we no longer control for age using
categorical variables but instead include a
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Table 3: Reporting a Six – Logistic Regression with Average Marginal Effects
_________________________________________________________________________
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

_________________________________________________________________________

Notes: The dependent variable is whether the subject reported a six or not. All models are
logistic regression with age categories, gender and parents included as controls. The first
column in each cell reports average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses.
The second column in each cell reports naive p-values in italics and FDR adjusted qvalues in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by group. Each cluster is a set of 10
subjects who were given instructions at the same time. Subjects in the “Both” treatment
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reported two outcomes. To analyze peer effects in Column (3) and Column (4), we
exclude the first subject from each group whose probability of reporting a six should not
be affected by anyone else. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
second-order polynomial in order to fit an age trend. The coefficient on age is positive and
significant while the coefficient on age is negative, indicating that lying exhibits an inverted
U pattern. Figure 1 displays the predicted six-reports as a function of age with 95%
confidence intervals. Note that the probability of reporting a six is significantly higher than
20% across the whole domain, which is above 16.7%, the expected frequency of reporting a
six under truth-telling. These results indicate that lying happens at all age levels. The
probability of reporting a six peaks at age 12 and subsequently decreases thereafter.
Figure 1: Reporting a Six as a Function of Age
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

Notes: Probability of reporting a six across ages. Error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Ages are censored at 4 and 19.
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In Column (3) we test for peer effects on reporting a six. Recall, the “Peer Proportion”
variable as the proportion of previous reports within the group that were six. The coefficient
is positive and statistically significant with a p-value < 0.001. This provides evidence that
the probability of reporting a six is influenced by previous subjects in the group reporting a
six. If one additional child out of five previous children reports a six, it leads to a 5.36
percentage point increase in the probability of a subsequent child reporting a six.
In Column (4) we decompose the peer effect by gender. “Female Peer Proportion”
measures the proportion of female subjects before the subject in question who reported a six,
and “Male Peer Proportion” does likewise for male subjects. While gender does not have a
direct effect on one’s lying behavior, our data show a difference in how boys and girls are
influenced by the other subjects in their group. The coefficient on “Female Peer Proportion”
is the effect of previous female subjects on male subjects and it is positive but not significant.
The coefficient of “Male Peer Proportion” is the effect of previous male subjects on male
subjects, which is large, positive, and statistically significant (p = 0.004). As we turn to girls,
the coefficient on “Female Peer Proportion” plus the coefficient on “Female × Female Peer
Proportion”, 0.314 is positive, and significant (p = 0.007). The effect of boys on girls is “Male
Peer Proportion” plus “Female × Male Peer Proportion” which is 0.18, and marginally
significant at p=0.08. To summarize, boys emulate boys and girls emulate girls. We interpret
this as evidence that children take their social cues within gender, tending to emulate others
who share their gender identity.
In Table 4 we turn to the effects of the salience of subjects’ costumed identities.
Column (1) contains the same regressions as from Table 3 except we add the additional
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indicator variables for self-reported “bad guy”, salience condition, and the interaction
between the two. In this table we drop subjects who self reported as “both a good guy and
bad guy” or as “neither a good guy or bad guy”. We hypothesized that subjects would behave
more congruously with their costumed character in the costume salience condition. Because
“good guys” and “bad guys” are expected to respond in opposite directions, the interaction
term is essential. Instead, we find evidence for the opposite effect. The coefficient on salience
is the effect on “good guys” and it is positive but insignificant. The coefficient on the
interaction term “Salience × Bad Guy” is the differential effect of costume salience on “bad
guys” relative to “good guys” it is negative and significant at p = 0.036. The results are
tantalizing yet unconvincing. We hypothesized that the relatively lower rates of lying in the
“other” conditions may be attenuating the effect.
In Column (2), we decompose the effect of costume salience into “self” and “other”
conditions. We include interactions between salience and “other”, “bad guy” and “other”,
and the triple interaction between salience, “bad guy”, and “other”. The coefficient on “bad
guy”, which is positive and significant at p = 0.019, implies that those wearing “bad guy”
costumes are about 21 percentage points more likely to lie to benefit themselves than those
wearing a “good guy” costume. Costumes are self-selected so this could be either a selection
effect, a causal effect of wearing the costume, or some combination thereof. The
manipulation is not the costume but the salience of the costume. The coefficient on salience
is interpreted as the effect of the costume salience condition on “good guys” when the
beneficiary is one’s self. The coefficient increased relative to Column (1), and is now
significant at p = 0.049. Interestingly, the coefficient on “Salience × Bad Guy”, which is the
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differential effect of salience on “bad guys” relative to “good guys” when one’s self is the
beneficiary, is now larger in magnitude, negative and significant at p = 0.003. The overall
effect of costume salience on “bad guys” when one’s self is the beneficiary, is the sum of the
coefficients on salience and “Salience × Bad Guy”, which is -0.153 negative and marginally
significant at the p = 0.08.
The fact that the coefficients on “Salience × Other Treatment” and “Salience × Other
Treatment× Bad Guy” have opposite signs relative to their self-condition counterparts (i.e.
“Salience” and “Salience × Bad Guy”) confirms that the salience of costume had an effect
primarily in the “self” condition. The salience of costume had no significant effect in the
“other” condition.

85

Table 4: The Effect of Priming on Reporting a Six – Logistic Regression with Average
Marginal Effects

Notes: The dependent variable is whether the subject reported a six or not. All models are
logistic regression with age categories, gender and parents included as controls. The first
column in each cell reports average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses.
The second column in each cell reports naive p-values in italics and FDR adjusted qvalues in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by group. Each cluster is a set of 10
subjects who were given instructions at the same time. Subjects in the “Both” treatment
reported two outcomes. We managed to record the costume information for only 464
subjects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Drawing attention to “good guys” costumed identity causes them to lie more, while drawing
attention to “bad guys” costumed identity causes them to lie less. This result is opposite to
what we predicted.

1.8

Power Analysis
A potential concern of this analysis is that statistical tests may not be sufficiently well

powered. We have 540 subjects placed into 2 × 3 × 2 randomly assigned conditions. In
addition, we test non-assigned features like age and peer effects. In many of our tests,
statistical power would not appear to be problematic as the tests pool across conditions, and
appropriately so as the other conditions and variables of interest are orthogonal. However,
for some analyses we estimate triple interactions leading to splits in the range of 1/8th of the
sample (about 75 subjects) per cell. If statistical power is low, there is a risk that statistically
significant results are lucky, generated from sampling variation and not from a true
underlying effect.
We conduct an ex-post power analysis using Monte Carlo methods. We subject all of
our results that are significant at the p < 0.1 level to this analysis. For each given logit
regression we predict the probability that an individual will report a six. We then generate
1,000 data sets, each randomly assigning the outcome (reporting a six) to an observation
based on the predicted probability. On each of these data sets we run the same regression and
estimate the average marginal effects. The proportion of data sets that generated a significant
coefficient at p < 0.05 is our estimate of statistical power for that coefficient. We conduct
this analysis for every regression specification in the paper (four in Table 1 and two in Table
2; six total).
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Conclusion and Discussion
We found that our high-stakes manipulation had no effect. This is in-line with the
results of previous studies (Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi,
2013). However, we ran a pilot in the preceding year with a similar design and slightly
different stakes and found an effect. We view the result in this paper as a failed manipulation
as we suspect that our high stakes were not sufficiently high. We believe that we cannot
conclude much from this manipulation.
Changing the beneficiary had a large impact on lying. The “other” condition had
much less lying than the “self” condition. Gino and Pierce (2010) and Cadsby, Du and Song
(2016) show that people lie for others when they care for them, especially if the other person
is part of their group. Michailidou and Rotondi (2019) find that individuals are not willing to
lie to benefit an out-group member and that lying for an in-group member is uncommon. Our
results are consistent with these findings as the beneficiary in our “other” condition is an
anonymous stranger. We also find that the “both” condition reduces lying for one’s own gain
but not for the gain of others. Wiltermuth (2011) and Gino, Ayal and Ariely (2013) find that
people are more likely to view dishonesty as morally acceptable when their dishonesty would
benefit others. The past studies found that children lie more for both themselves and others
when there is an opportunity to lie to help others. Our results are contrary to this finding.
Instead, honesty for reporting the “other” die spilled over to reporting the “self” die but not
vice versa. This could be caused for a number of reasons. The cognitive load placed on the
children for engaging in the two activities may have caused them to lie less. Or the
inconsistency between lying about one report but not the other may have made rationalizing
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lying more difficult. A third potential explanation is that the children may have thought they
would be more likely caught lying if they reported a six for themselves and not a six for
“other”. We cannot test between these different hypotheses unfortunately.
We find no direct effect of gender. This is consistent with the result of Nieken and
Dato (2016). However, some research suggests that men are more likely to lie to advance
themselves, while women are more likely to lie to advance others (DePaulo et al., 1996;
Feldman et al., 2002; Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Dreber and Johannesson, 2008). The sample
here differs from other studies as it is primarily children.
It is surprising to us that costume salience led to behavior incongruous with one’s
costume. Past research found the salience of identity to have effects congruous with the
identity (Cohn, Fehr and Maréchal, 2014; Cohn, Maréchal and Noll, 2015; Celse and Chang,
2017). We offer some speculation regarding this finding. One possibility is that the costume
led to congruous ethical behavior earlier in the day and this bolstered a moral licensing/selfconscious effect later during our experiment.
However, for this explanation to make sense it would require that the salience
manipulation not only made the ethical orientation of one’s costume more salient but also
made past recent ethical actions more salient. While possible, the manipulation made no
mention of recent activity.
An alternative explanation is that the salience manipulation felt like an announcement
or confession of moral disposition to an observing adult. Past research has shown that people
conform more to social norms when they feel like they are being observed even though they
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are not actually being observed. For example, Haley and Fessler (2005) found that the image
of stylized eyespots increased giving in a dictator game. Mol, van der Heijden and Potters
(2020) showed that subjects in a virtual reality environment were less likely to cheat when a
virtual observer was watching, compared to when the virtual observer was looking at a
smartphone. If the children thought that the adults were monitoring them, publicly
announcing to an adult that they are “good guys” may have reduced the feeling of being
observed, while announcing to an adult that they are “bad guys” may have increased the
feeling of being observed.
There are a couple of reasons we believe this explanation is less convincing than the
moral licensing explanation. First, several papers find no effect of watching eye cues
(Pfattheicher, Schindler and Nockur, 2019; Ayal, Celse and Hochman, 2019), suggesting that
the effect may not be very robust. Second, and more importantly, the experimenters who
asked the priming question were different from the experimenters who ran the game and gave
the candy. The experimenters who asked the priming question were also physically distant,
at about 25 feet away from the point at which the trick-or-treaters reported their die rolls.
This means that for this “feeling of differential monitoring” hypothesis to be true, trick-ortreaters would have to feel that their communication to one experimenter affected other
experimenters 25 feet away without the use of communication. This sounds less plausible to
us but it remains a possibility. An alternative design that makes the salience manipulation
private could potentially disentangle this effect.
While modern practice has mostly done away with the norm-violating “tricks” of the
past, in our contrived setting, victimless lying for candy is pervasive. And like the paired
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practice of costume-wearing and norm violations in past traditions, we see a relationship
between costume and lying in our study. “Bad guys” in the no-salience condition lie more
than “good guys”. This suggests that there is either a causal relationship or a self-selection
effect of wearing a “bad guy” costume. Even if the effect is entirely through self-selection,
this is still an interesting relationship. It means that those prone to norm violations select a
consistent costumed identity.
Identity plays a second role in our study in the form of gender identity. We find that
reporting a six increases the probability that a child later in line reports a six. This effect is
only significant within gender. We offer a couple of reasons why this may be the case. First,
if children tend to befriend within gender, trick-or-treat with friends, and emulate their
friends, this could generate the result. Though we did not keep records, our impression was
that most groups of trick-or-treaters were not groups of friends but families. This seems to be
especially true for the younger trick-or-treaters, though there were certainly some groups of
friends. However, the great majority of the trick-or-treaters within a participant’s group of
ten would have been strangers even if they had approached the house with family or friends.
Indeed, many participated without any other individuals from an observable group,
and those that participated with someone from their group usually only had no more than one
or two accompanying them. Our sense is that the effect of friend emulation would have to be
exceptionally strong to be the sole-driver of our within-gender peer effect. We offer another
explanation for the within-gender peer effect: because socially acceptable behavior is often
gender-specific, preferentially emulating others within one’s own gender is a simple and
effective heuristic. Participants may have applied such a heuristic even when the norm does
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not vary by gender, as is the case for lying.
While we suggest caution in over-inferring from our boundary-case context (i.e.
extreme costumes for children), the implications of our results suggest that policies that
require particular kinds of dress may influence the behavior of the wearers. This has been a
motivation for educators to adopt school uniforms and indeed Evans, Kremer and Ngatia
(2008) found that school uniforms in Kenya reduced absenteeism. We speculate that the
effect of clothing on an individual’s sense of identity may also be a motivation for business
dress codes. Wearing a suit serves to signal professionalism to clients, but in many businesses
employees wear suits even on days for which they do not meet with clients. This suggests
that such dress codes also serve an internal purpose. As a counterpoint, explicit “casual
Friday” policies encourage less formal clothing as it is perceived to create a more convivial
work environment.
We study the impact of Halloween costumes on the ethical behavior of 544 trick-ortreaters. We find that lying is more common when oneself is the beneficiary than when
someone else is the beneficiary. We find that having the opportunity to lie for both oneself
and someone else causes more honesty when reporting for oneself. Lying peaks at age 12
and is influenced by the lying of peers. In particular, peer effects are strong and
predominantly within gender. Finally, we find that rendering the ethical orientation of one’s
costume salient leads to more or less lying depending on whether one’s costume is a good
guy or a bad guy. The salience of costume causes “good guys” to lie more and “bad guys” to
lie less, consistent with a moral licensing. Though we believe this is the more plausible
explanation, we cannot falsify the alternative explanation that trick-or-treaters believed that
publicly reporting one’s identity would cause differential monitoring from the experimenters.
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This paper extends the literature on lying, and it is one of the first papers in economics
that connects clothing and identity to ethical behavior. By leveraging a naturally-occurring
cultural tradition — costume-wearing on Halloween — we elucidate the relationship between
clothing and behavior using an extreme boundary case. The results also inform us on the
nature of costume wearing itself, implying that the tradition may have served as a means to
encourage norm-violations by temporarily changing people’s sense of identity.
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